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"I am not a number! I am a free man!" 
THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT, 1998 (AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT THE 




Introduction (to Part 2) 
Part 1 of this piece undertook a critical analysis of the constitutionality of the 
affirmative action scheme as contained in Chapter III of the Employment Equity Act, 
1998 (or EEA). The author argued that the scheme, and especially its obsession with 
demographic representivity as a primary objective of affirmative action in employment, 
is unconstitutional. In this second part the author will critically evaluate the 
Constitutional Court's judgment in the recent case of South African Police Service v 
Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 ZACC 23. After a brief discussion of the recent 
amendments to the EEA (in respect of its affirmative action provisions), the author will 
then provide conclusions and further reasons for the imperative to reject the Act's 
version of affirmative action (and, more broadly, the notion of demographic 
representivity within our equality paradigm).  
  
                                        
  A line from the introduction to a 1967 UK television series, The Prisoner (about a man who, after 
resigning from a government agency, is kidnapped from his London home and awakes in a strange 
village, where he is known only by the name Number Six). 
  The numbering of sections in the text and footnotes is sequential and follows on that of Part 1. 
  Andre M Louw. LLD (Stellenbosch). Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch. Email: 
alouw@sun.ac.za. The views expressed here are my own and do not reflect the views of my 
employer. 
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4 The disappointment of Barnard (CC) 
I referred (in Part 1 of this piece) to the "usual suspects" who are often found to 
criticise affirmative action and other aspects of transformation of our society. The 
Barnard (CC) judgment was roundly welcomed by another group of usual suspects on 
the other side of the fence, including the Black Management Forum (its rather 
controversial former head, Jimmy Manyi, who has never seemed really grounded to 
me, must now have finally flown the coop and be over the moon). But apart from its 
positive reception in such quarters, there is a significant number of commentators who 
have criticised it, and, for a significant proportion of them, the word "disappointment", 
apparently, best sums up their feelings. I was also disappointed in reading this 
judgment; not because of the outcome, but because this prominent and long-awaited 
case had promised so much more in the way of potential clarification of extremely 
important questions within the equality and affirmative action discourse. I will highlight 
just three aspects here, which I believe the judges of the Constitutional Court dealt 
with most disappointingly. These are the following: 
- the appropriate standard of review of the constitutionality of purported 
affirmative action measures; 
- more specific to the facts and context of this case, the court's treatment of the 
issue of the impact of the claimant's non-appointment on service delivery; and 
- more generally, and more in line with the theme of this piece, the court's 
treatment of the concept of representivity. 
I will say something on each in turn. 
4.1 The appropriate standard of review of the constitutionality of 
purported affirmative action measures 
Before I include discussion of the appropriate standard for the constitutional review 
of affirmative action programmes (as treated in Barnard (CC)), I should just mention 
that I will later call for the complete removal of affirmative action disputes under the 
EEA from our equality jurisprudence in terms of section 9 of the Bill of Rights. 
Accordingly, what follows has little to do with the EEA, which, as I argue ad nauseum 
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in this piece, should bow out sooner rather than later. However, this being said, I 
expect that Barnard (CC) will generate some academic commentary regarding the 
court's treatment of the standard of review of affirmative measures, and I will also 
weigh in briefly in this regard. 
In respect of the standard of review issue, and when considering the differences in 
opinion between the various judges in Barnard (CC), it might not be inaccurate to 
characterise this judgment as providing little more than an amplification of 
consternation. Some academic commentators have written, very convincingly, in 
criticism of Van Heerden's rationality test.1 Yet, the judges of the Constitutional Court 
dealt only cursorily with such criticism, if at all – notably, Moseneke ACJ, writing the 
majority opinion, did not refer to it at all; neither did Cameron J et al. Van der 
Westhuizen J refers to one of the pieces written in this regard in a footnote, without 
apparent approval or comment (with the terse remark that "[t]he Van Heerden test 
has been criticised for failing to incorporate a fairness standard").2 I believe that the 
academic criticism of Van Heerden's test deserves proper consideration by the courts. 
I will not elaborate here beyond providing what I believe to be the main points of 
criticism against the "rationality test" (others have written in more detail on this issue, 
and I will refer to such views where relevant): 
1) A rationality standard of review, as explained by Moseneke J in Van Heerden, 
pays an inappropriate measure of deference to decision-makers in respect of the 
formulation of affirmative policies and measures. Pretorius makes the point that there 
is an intimate relationship between the standard of review of an affirmative action 
measure and the degree of justification (and therefore accountability) required of 
decisions which impact on constitutional rights and interests.3 I tend to agree with the 
author that the Van Heerden approach's measure of deference paid towards state 
actors involved in drafting and implementing affirmative measures is out of line with 
the more general standard of review set by the drafters of the Constitution, and as 
                                        
1  See, for example (all of the following having been referred to earlier in Part 1): McGregor 2013 
TSAR; Pretorius 2013 SALJ; Pretorius 2010 SAJHR; Malan 2014 De Jure. 
2  Van der Westhuizen J SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 ZACC 23 (2 September 2014) para 160 
and fn 159 (hereinafter Barnard (CC)). 
3  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 37. 
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contained in section 36 of the Bill of Rights.4 On my reading of Van Heerden it does 
not provide a clear reason for this discrepancy (apart from the frequent emphasis 
placed, in the various judgments in this case, on the apparently "special" place and 
role for the equality right within our constitutional dispensation). But within the greater 
scheme of the Constitution the potential cost of such an ill-justified approach is just 
too high: "By adopting a deferential standard, courts protect the state from having to 
explain a decision in the first place, thereby circumventing the need to develop a 
judicial standard of scrutiny commensurate with the demands of the principles of 
openness and accountability, implicit in the s 36 norm of an open and democratic 
society".5 Pretorius also explains how a fairness approach leaves much broader scope 
for inclusive adjudicative reasoning ("since fairness review also involves the balancing 
of competing claims, it opens discursive avenues for a wider spectrum of relevant 
concerns to influence judicial deliberation"6). Malan points out that rationality review 
may also implicate the separation of powers when one considers the role of the courts 
in respect of constitutional adjudication (and their discrete oversight role over the 
conduct of the executive).7 Rationality review may impair the courts' role of providing 
justice in individual cases (Malan explains how the Labour Appeal Court's judgment in 
Barnard is an example of this). Accordingly, there may be a case to be made for 
arguing that such a rationality review may in fact be incompatible with the 
fundamental right of access to courts as guaranteed in section 34 of the Bill of Rights). 
2) A second reason why Van Heerden's rejection of a role for fairness (and 
proportionality) appears strange in that it seems to ignore the clear text of the equality 
                                        
4  Pretorius explains: "The Constitution … commits itself to a standard of review which requires all 
rights limiting action to be 'reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom'. This is the standard prescribed by the Constitution a right 
in a particular context are justified. It is the standard that the drafters believed to be necessary to 
afford the fundamental character of constitutional rights its due recognition." Pretorius 2013 SALJ 
38. 
5  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 39. Pieterse calls s 36 (and the requirements it entails) "arguably the most 
significant provision enabling the fostering of a 'culture of justification'" under our Constitution – 
see Pieterse 2005 SAPL 163. 
6  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 43. 
7  "The central focus of the judicial function and primary responsibility of courts, unlike that of the 
legislature and the executive, are not these general collective social policies and goals, but the 
protection of individual (constitutional) rights … [Courts] must not primarily pursue policies deemed 
to advance or secure an economic, political or social situation for the benefit of all. That is the 
distinctive terrain of the legislature and the executive" (Malan 2014 De Jure 134-135). 
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right. What makes this especially strange is the fact that Moseneke J in Van Heerden 
specifically emphasised that the respective sub-sections of section 9 should be read 
together8 (an "intra-textual" reading of the equality right). But the exposition of the 
rationality standard of review based on section 9(2)'s internal test for the compliance 
of an affirmative measure would appear to follow a different approach; it ignores the 
content of a significant part of this sub-section, particularly its first sentence (i.e. it 
fails to recognise an "inter-textual" approach). Such an approach ignores the fact that 
this first sentence tells us that "[e]quality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms". Malan explains: 
Following the basic tenets of contextual interpretation, section 9(2) must be read as 
a whole. It cannot be interpreted as if its first provision is not in existence. In fact, 
measures for remedial equality, including affirmative action adopted in terms of 
section 9(2), are indeed regarded as expressions of the right to equality and not 
exceptions thereto, because the provision (the second sentence of s9(2) follows on 
the first) includes into the right to equality the full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms. This underscores the importance of reading section 9(2) as a whole.9 
The importance of this point is, of course, that a proper reading of the first sentence 
of section 9(2) would seem to demand the consideration, in reviewing any affirmative 
measure which purports to comply with section 9(2), of the "full and equal enjoyment" 
of all rights and freedoms – ie it demands consideration of the impact of any such 
measure on those disadvantaged by it.10 
3) I would suggest that Moseneke ACJ in Barnard (CC) himself exposed the 
possible inappropriateness of the rationality standard of review, in his remarks 
regarding the importance of the lawfulness of the implementation of affirmative 
                                        
8  Moseneke J declared as follows (in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 25 ILJ 1593 (CC) paras 
28, 30 (hereinafter Van Heerden): "A comprehensive understanding of the Constitution's 
conception of equality requires a harmonious reading of the provisions of section 9 ... In other 
words, the provisions of section 9(1) and section 9(2) are complementary; both contribute to the 
constitutional goal of achieving equality to ensure 'full and equal enjoyment of all rights'. A 
disjunctive or oppositional reading of the two subsections would frustrate the foundational equality 
objective of the Constitution and its broader social justice imperatives." 
9  See Malan 2014 De Jure 139. 
10  Which is why Malan argues that, even if ss 9(3) and (5) were not applicable to the decision of the 
National Commissioner in Barnard (as Moseneke ACJ in Barnard (CC) para 51, held as the basis 
for rejection of the approach in Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS 2014 2 SA 1 (SCA) (hereinafter 
Barnard (SCA)), and even if such a decision was to be considered solely on the basis of s 9(2), the 
Supreme Court of Appeal's reasoning and its conclusion would remain valid – see Malan 2014 De 
Jure 138-139. 
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measures (even though such remarks were made in the context of or with reference 
to rationality).11 I would suggest that the lawfulness of a policy or measure is largely 
moot until such time as it is implemented. The emphasis on the lawfulness of 
implementation (a measure must be applied to advance its legitimate purpose and 
nothing else, and implementation of corrective measures must be rational) would 
suggest that a perfectly rational measure can be abused. And the consideration of 
such potential abuse naturally implicates the impact of the measure on those it serves 
to disadvantage. If the mere rationality of the measure in terms of Van Heerden's 
interpretation of the internal test for compliance as found in the text of section 9(2) is 
truly sufficient to mark such a measure as being constitutionally compliant, then these 
considerations regarding its implementation must surely be irrelevant? Accordingly, 
the buck simply cannot stop at the point of merely measuring the rationality of the 
measure. After all, in the context of demographic representivity as not only the 
yardstick for success but also as the clearly stated legislative objective12 of affirmative 
measures under the EEA (which, for the first time faced and then, puzzlingly, 
withstood the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court in Barnard), it is submitted that it is 
patently clear that one finds here a system that unashamedly displays "naked 
preference" for one or more (but, in practice, it is invariably and by definition one) 
race groups in the process of differentiating between persons. Is this to serve a 
"legitimate governmental purpose"?13 If not, this same court warned us in the past 
that this is unacceptable under our Constitution.14 But one must then ask: what is the 
standard for the determination of the lawfulness of implementation? Moseneke ACJ 
says it is rationality (implementation must be for the purpose of achieving the 
legitimate objective of the measure and "nothing else"). But we cannot remove this 
determination from the context of affirmative measures, whose legitimate purpose 
                                        
11  Barnard (CC) para 39: "As a bare minimum, the principle of legality would require that the 
implementation of a legitimate restitution measure must be rationally related to the terms and 
objects of the measure. It must be applied to advance its legitimate purpose and nothing else. 
Ordinarily, irrational conduct in implementing a lawful project attracts unlawfulness. Therefore, 
implementation of corrective measures must be rational. Although these are the minimum 
requirements, it is not necessary to define the standard finally." 
12  See, again, the wording of s 2(b) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (the EEA), as referred 
to earlier. 
13  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) paras 24-26. 
14  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) paras 24-26. 
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(Van Heerden tells us, and this is confirmed in Barnard (CC)) is "remedial", 
"restitutionary" or "corrective". The only logical implication is that the determination 
of the lawfulness of the implementation of such an otherwise rational measure must 
be its fairness and/or the impact of such implementation on the rights of those 
disadvantaged by it. I would suggest that this is borne out by the words of Moseneke 
J in Van Heerden: 
[A] measure should not constitute an abuse of power or impose such substantial and 
undue harm on those excluded from its benefits that our long-term constitutional 
goal would be threatened.15 
The reference to substantial harm on those excluded from benefits simply cannot refer 
merely to the lawfulness of the implementation of a measure being measured with 
reference to rationality; it must require interrogation of the fairness of such 
implementation. In fact, Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena have highlighted the fact that 
the court in Van Heerden, even after pronouncing on the aptness of the rationality 
standard, in effect applied a form of fairness review to the case at hand.16 Cameron J 
et al in Barnard (CC) tell us that fairness is a foundational, constitutional value.17 As 
observed elsewhere, Moseneke ACJ, however, tells us that a rational measure which 
complies with the test in section 9(2) cannot be unfair, but his own wording is 
confusing (or, at best, ambiguous) and it would appear as if he is referring only to the 
fact that such a measure cannot be presumptively unfair in the meaning of section 
9(5)). The question for me remains: can an affirmative measure that complies with 
the internal requirements of section 9(2) still be unfair? I would suggest that the 
answer is yes, as borne out by the example of the background to the litigation in 
Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security:18 A member of a designated group (who is 
also a woman, and thus "doubly disadvantaged" by past unfair discrimination) is faced 
with an absolute bar to advancement in employment for the simple reason that her 
group constitutes a minority (and its numerical representation in the broader 
population disqualifies her from benefitting from a demographically-based target). She 
                                        
15  Van Heerden para 44 
16  Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law 9-28. 
17  Barnard (CC) para 98. 
18  Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security 2013 3 SA 486 (LC) (hereinafter Naidoo) as referred to 
earlier. 
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has no control over this, and is faced with a highly arbitrary (and as I've argued, 
irrational) ground of differentiation, on the basis of an immutable characteristic (her 
membership of the group). The measure would apparently qualify as rational under 
Van Heerden's test, as would its implementation for the purpose of advancing 
designated groups in the workplace. But it is grossly unfair and constitutes a grave 
limitation of Ms Naidoo's rights. The abuse inherent in the implementation of this 
measure lies not (solely) in its irrationality, but in its inequity.19 
Apart from the above, there are other reasons why the Van Heerden approach might 
be objectionable. One of these reasons is what I view to be its inappropriate focus on 
and hegemonic treatment of the equality right (and, more specifically, section 9(2)). 
Even though section 9(2) has been characterised as "[p]erhaps the most pivotal of 
the transformation-orientated provisions in the Bill of Rights",20 is there a hierarchy of 
rights in the Bill of Rights which means that this section (or, the equality right, more 
generally) trumps other fundamental rights, without more?21 One must ask, what 
about the other specifically entrenched rights? Earlier landmark case law from this 
same court placed great emphasis on the role of the fundamental human dignity of all 
South Africans (Harksen, of course, but compare also Hoffmann v SAA:22 one might 
ask whether Barnard (CC)'s implied approval of the EEA's numbers game on the basis 
of its application of a rationality standard of review might lead to future complainants 
relying on being members of a "vulnerable group in society" – similar to HIV-positive 
persons in the words of Ngcobo J - and based on the impairment of their dignity when 
faced with such arbitrary and irrational demographic target-setting). Would there be 
                                        
19  As Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena, explain: "It is difficult to see how fairness considerations can be 
purged from the notion of substantive equality underlying the whole of section 9. The reasoning 
in the Naidoo case demonstrates that fairness and proportionality considerations cannot be 
excluded from the evaluation of affirmative action, if justice is to be done to the third Van Heerden 
criterion, namely that the measure must promote the achievement of substantive equality. It 
seems hardly contestable that unfair or unreasonably disproportional forms of affirmative action 
would be irreconcilable with realising the long-term ideal of equality based on the affirmation of 
equal worth and respect." Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law 9-27. 
20  Pieterse 2005 SAPL 162. 
21  Some believe this to be the case – Partington and Van der Walt 2005 Obiter 608 declare that 
"Equality is the most important value in our fledgling democracy". 
22  Hoffmann v SAA 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC). 
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merit in such a claim? Maybe not if it concerns a white male, but what about the 
probably more sympathetic case of an Indian female (such as in Naidoo's case)? 
A final reason why I believe the Van Heerden approach is inappropriate is that it 
appears to seek to remove the equality right from the broader scheme of the Bill of 
Rights; it privileges equality over other fundamental rights and foundational values 
(e.g. non-racialism);23 and it ignores the scheme of the limitations clause (where 
rationality is just one of the broader range of relevant factors to consider in the 
weighing up of rights and interests).24 And too many judges (even of the Constitutional 
Court) have by now highlighted the importance of our constitutional project and its 
foundational values (including non-racialism and the promotion of human dignity), 
either expressly or by implication, for us to say simply that the rationality of the source 
of an affirmative measure (be it a provision of the EEA, or the Act's chapter III more 
generally, or an employment equity plan that purports to implement the provisions of 
the Act) should be determinative of its legality and constitutionality. We have seen too 
many examples of illegitimate "affirmative" measures – compare du Preez's irrational 
race-based scoring system for applicants;25 Naidoo's ludicrous calculations of race and 
gender representation to the third decimal;26 Coetzer's non-filling of essential posts in 
a clearly essential service;27 and Jafta J's (in Barnard (CC)) approval of job reservation 
                                        
23  In the process, I would suggest, ignoring at least one characterisation of our transformative 
constitutional project: "The challenge of achieving equality within this transformation project 
involves the eradication of systemic forms of domination and material disadvantage based on race, 
gender, class and other grounds of inequality. It also entails the development of opportunities 
which allow people to realise their full human potential within positive social relationships" 
(Albertyn and Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 249). Replacing one systemic form of domination and material 
disadvantage with another (admittedly, probably more politically correct) such system is hardly 
desirable. 
24  I would suggest that van der Westhuizen J's reliance on proportionality as the appropriate standard 
of review in Barnard (CC) – borrowing from the use of this concept in s 36 of the Constitution – 
might be indicative of a realisation that the rationality standard is inconsistent with the broader 
scheme of the Bill of Rights. 
25  Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 27 ILJ 1811 (SE). 
26  Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security 2013 3 SA 486 (LC). 
27  Coetzer v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 24 ILJ 163 (LC). Dupper, I would submit, is rather 
diplomatic in his assessment of the practice as exposed in this case: "The decision in Coetzer casts 
doubt on the lawfulness of what some studies indicate has become common practice in the public 
service, namely the refusal to fill positions even though qualified members of the non-favoured 
groups are available. If one takes into consideration the fact that the public service is experiencing 
an alarmingly high rate of vacancies, especially at senior management level, this judgment takes 
on additional significance." (Dupper 2008 SAJHR 438.) 
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"for black officers".28 If recent history has shown us anything, it is that the toxic mix 
of the Employment Equity Act, the principle of demographic representivity and Van 
Heerden's rationality test are nothing short of a weapon of mass destruction in the 
hands of (public service) human resource managers. Our Constitution (if not the 
judges of our Constitutional Court29) demands that we draw the line somewhere, and 
a useful place to do so is at the point where anyone – white male or member of a 
minority designated group – is faced with an absolute barrier to employment or 
advancement in employment (or any other form of access to benefits). And the reason, 
very clearly, must be because of the self-evident, unconstitutional unfairness of such 
practices. After all, when we consider that the application of affirmative action under 
the EEA occurs in our workplaces, would/should the right to fair labour practices in 
section 23 of the Bill of Rights (which is available to "everyone") not provide additional 
justification for the arguments that a requirement of fairness testing should be a sine 
qua non?  
Despite these and other possible objections to the Van Heerden standard of review, 
and whilst no single judge in Barnard (CC) would definitively reject it, it is interesting 
that a few of the judges provided us with teasing indications that they might be willing 
to do so (by implication). Most striking is Moseneke ACJ's above-mentioned remarks 
regarding the requirement for the lawfulness of the implementation of a rationally 
designed affirmative action measure.30 Of course, this notwithstanding, Moseneke ACJ 
                                        
28  Barnard (CC) para 227. 
29  I refer, again, to the apparent express approval of race-based job reservation by Jafta J in Barnard 
(CC) para 227. 
30  I include a montage of the judge's thoughts on the subject here. When reading it, please bear in 
mind the (rather diffident) expression of the "rationality test" as formulated in Van Heerden: "Our 
quest to achieve equality must occur within the discipline of our Constitution. Measures that are 
directed at remedying past discrimination must be formulated with due care not to invade unduly 
the dignity of all concerned. We must remain vigilant that remedial measures under the 
Constitution are not an end in themselves. They are not meant to be punitive nor retaliatory. Their 
ultimate goal is to urge us on towards a more equal and fair society that hopefully is non-racial, 
non-sexist and socially inclusive." (Van Heerden para 30); "Once the measure in question passes 
the test, it is neither unfair nor presumed to be unfair ... This however, does not oust the court's 
power to interrogate whether the measure is a legitimate restitution measure within the scope of 
the empowering section 9(2)" (Van Heerden para 37); and "As a bare minimum, the principle of 
legality would require that the implementation of a legitimate restitution measure must be 
rationally related to the terms and objects of the measure. It must be applied to advance its 
legitimate purpose and nothing else. Ordinarily, irrational conduct in implementing a lawful project 
attracts unlawfulness. Therefore, implementation of corrective measures must be rational. 
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was not willing to take the leap and reverse his earlier finding on the rationality 
standard as expressed in Van Heerden. Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ were 
more forthcoming in this regard, when they declared that "adjudicating Ms Barnard's 
challenge requires us to apply a less deferential standard than mere rationality".31 
However, in doing so, they display what I view to be an inappropriate deference to 
the CC's earlier decision in Van Heerden. The judges tell us why they view the 
rationality standard as inappropriate in this case: 
[Barnard's] complaint was that she had been unfairly discriminated against, in 
contravention of the [Employment Equity] Act. In our view, that Act imposes a 
standard different from, and additional to, rationality. The important constitutional 
values that can be in tension when a decision-maker implements remedial measures 
require a court to examine this implementation with a more exacting level of 
scrutiny.32 
While I would suggest that these members of the court were (finally) on the right 
track, it is disappointing to see that they imply that the EEA imposes some standard 
different to that of rationality, but they then (it is submitted) do a rather shoddy job 
of explaining what this standard is (without really explaining how/where the Act 
imposes such a standard): 
Alleged discrimination under the Constitution … raises its own problems. We must 
therefore formulate a standard specific to the Act, one that is rigorous enough to 
ensure that the implementation of a remedial measure is "consistent with the purpose 
of [the] Act" – namely, to avoid over-rigid implementation, to balance the interests 
of the various designated groups, and to respect the dignity of rejected applicants. 
For these reasons, we consider the appropriate standard to be fairness.33 
In the light of the preceding discussion in this piece I would suggest that much more 
detailed explanation is required. These last three mentioned judges based their claim 
on such a "special" call for fairness sourced from the Employment Equity Act on the 
provisions of a section we have encountered before – section 2 (which deals with the 
purpose of the Act). They relied on the wording of section 2(a), and its recognition of 
"the importance of 'fair treatment in employment'".34 Let's leave aside the specifics of 
                                        
Although these are the minimum requirements, it is not necessary to define the standard finally." 
(Van Heerden para 39). 
31  Barnard (CC) para 95. 
32  Barnard (CC) para 95. 
33  Barnard (CC) paras 97-98. 
34  Cameron J et al in Barnard (CC) para 98 (and fn 108). 
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this case (and the question of whether Ms Barnard or anyone similarly placed would 
recognise this notion of fair treatment in its application through the numbers game). 
More generally, the EEA is, apart from its grand claims to "equity" and "equitable" 
representation, hardly a poster child for the promotion or application of fairness in its 
operation. Apart from its nonsensical obsession with raw statistics as a proxy for 
equality (which is the main theme of this piece), we have also seen that the Act not 
only provides such a convoluted and ambiguous "prohibition" of the use of quotas in 
its section 15(3) that one might be excused for questioning the (rightful) 
condemnation of the legality of quotas by various judges in Barnard (CC). It also 
displays a significant measure of ambivalence in its "prohibition" on an affirmative 
measure functioning as an absolute bar to the appointment or advancement of 
persons who are not from the designated groups (in section 15(4)).35 Where do these 
judges find some special standard of fairness in this Act that is not to be found in the 
Constitution? Or was this just a way to avoid direct rejection of the majority's approach 
in Van Heerden (within the paradigm of the equality right and the Bill of Rights, rather 
than invoking the Employment Equity Act as some "special case")? These same three 
judges of the court also expressed what I view to be a puzzling degree of deference 
to the EEA elsewhere in their judgment.36 
Following Barnard (CC), we are probably no closer to a definitive answer on the 
appropriate constitutional standard for the review of an affirmative action measure. 
The majority view confirmed Van Heerden's rationality standard (albeit, as already 
noted, with some interesting apparent riders). Cameron J et al rejected rationality as 
too deferential and suggested (a rather vague and general conception of) fairness. 
Van der Westhuizen J rejected this fairness standard (as too vague and general) and 
                                        
35  As for the fact that the wording of the EEA in both ss 15(3) re quotas and s 15(4) re absolute 
barriers to employment is so ambiguous that it probably would allow for the implementation of 
such measures by a designated employer, see Partington and Van der Walt 2005 Obiter 598. 
36  Barnard (CC) para 89 fn 93, where they declare as follows (with reference to what was said in Van 
Heerden): "[Affirmative action measures] 'must be reasonably capable of attaining the desired 
outcome', may not be 'arbitrary, capricious or display naked preference' and 'should not constitute 
an abuse of power or impose such substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its benefits 
that our long-term constitutional goal would be threatened.' The Act has given additional content 
to this constitutional standard." [My emphasis]. In the light of what I have argued above I find the 
EEA to be the last place one would search for, and find, these constitutional requirements, and 
the judges did not explain the basis for this last aspect of their opinion. 
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suggested proportionality loosely based on the use of this concept under the 
limitations clause of the Bill of Rights. That notwithstanding, and despite the judge's 
consideration of the role of Ms Barnard's dignity in this case, it was held that the 
pursuit of (racial) representivity trumped it all – again, without proper explanation. 
We are, I would submit, not really any closer to determining the appropriate standard 
for review, and this I view to be Barnard (CC)'s single biggest failing and source for 
justifiable disappointment. 
4.2 The (non-)role of the contentious issue of service delivery in Barnard 
(CC) 
I do not intend to wade in here on the "representivity vs efficiency" debate37 that has 
frequently reared its head in respect of affirmative action. However, one matter that 
I find particularly worrying in the Constitutional Court's judgment in Barnard, in the 
light of the broader context of the litigation, is the degree of deference paid to the 
National Commissioner's decision on whether the failure to fill the relevant post would 
affect service delivery. This is not some peripheral issue; it is extremely important in 
the context of the greater constitutional milieu. As Pretorius observes: 
... the standard of judicial review affects the degree of public accountability expected 
of the state for actions which limit rights. Judicial review institutionalises the degree 
of public accountability through the imposition of a particular burden of justification.38 
Also, please remember that we are faced with almost daily media reports detailing 
alleged problems within the SA Police Service (quite apart from more general negative 
reporting on government service delivery). Even though the CC held that Ms Barnard 
had in fact abandoned her claim that her non-appointment negatively affected service 
delivery,39 this was an extremely important issue within the broader context of this 
case (if not on the pleadings, as such). 
                                        
37  See, for example, Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security 2002 23 ILJ 1020 (T); Coetzer v Minister 
of Safety and Security 2003 24 ILJ 163 (LC); McGregor 2003 JBL. 
38  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 31. 
39  See Barnard (CC) para 64. 
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With that in mind, it is one thing for the court to say – as various judges did40 – that 
this question of the potential impact on service delivery of the claimant's non-
appointment (or the fact that no-one was appointed) was a matter within the sole 
discretion of the Commissioner and that the court would or should be loath to interfere 
in this regard (especially in the light of the fact that the respondent had not brought 
a judicial review challenge to the decision). But it is another thing to consider that the 
judges of the court are surely all very familiar with the fact that this non-filling of posts 
through a system that at least bears some resemblance to a de facto, if not officially 
acknowledged, system of job reservation for designated groups, appears to have 
become quite widespread practice in the public service. At least, this seems to be true 
for the SA Police Service. If this were not the case we would surely not have seen so 
many cases similar to Barnard's and implicating the SAPS confronting the courts or 
arbitrators in recent years.41 And note also, of course, that at least one judge of the 
Constitutional Court not only acknowledged but also seemed to have no problem at 
all with a system of race-based job reservation42 - this simply must be cause for 
concern. 
A former director of the SA Institute for Race Relations recently published a very 
provocative piece in the media about the effects of ill-considered affirmative action 
policies (and other problems) on South African society, with a special focus on the 
public service and on government's poor record of service delivery.43 In this piece, 
                                        
40  See Barnard (CC) para 64 (per Moseneke ACJ); para 122 (per Cameron J et al); paras 187-189 
(per van der Westhuizen J) 
41  See Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security 2002 23 ILJ 1020 (T); Coetzer v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2003 24 ILJ 163 (LC); Fourie v Provincial Commissioner of the SA Police Service 
(North West Province) 2004 25 ILJ 1716 (LC); Inspector S Govender v South Police Service 
Unreported Case No PSSS 803-05/06; Public Servants Association obo Karriem v SA Police Service 
2007 28 ILJ 158 (LC); Van Eden and SAPS 2010 31 ILJ 1286 (BCA); Munsamy v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2013 34 ILJ 2900 (LC); Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security 2013 3 SA 486 (LC); 
Munsamy v Minister of Safety and Security 2013 34 ILJ 2900 (LC). 
42  See Barnard (CC) para 227 of the judgment of Jafta J: "By not appointing Ms Barnard and reserving 
the post for black officers, the National Commissioner sought to achieve representivity and equity 
in the Police Service. This accords with its Employment Equity Plan and is consistent with the 
purpose of the Act. Therefore, the National Commissioner's decision cannot constitute unfair 
discrimination nor can it be taken to be unfair. Consequently, unfairness as a standard cannot be 
sourced from the Act." [My emphasis] 
43  Kane-Berman 2014 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/why-south-africa-is-not-working. 
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John Kane-Berman blames affirmative action (as applied in the public sector) for some 
major service delivery problems: 
According to the Institute of Municipal Finance Officers, one third of all municipal 
officers, chief financial officers, and municipal supply chain managers do not have 
the right skills for the job. Three quarters of these posts are vacant. An audit by the 
South African Institution of Civil Engineering found that 83 of all municipalities - about 
a third of them - had no civil engineers, technologists, or technicians on their staff. 
Some 35% of these posts - enough for a thousand engineers - were unfilled, mainly 
because of budget constraints. The South African Institute of Electrical Engineers 
says huge numbers of engineers have been displaced.44 
What is probably one of the most controversial aspects of Kane-Berman's piece - and 
the one which I find most interesting - is its bare-fisted indictment of an alleged, rather 
sinister motive behind affirmative action public service recruitment (I believe that this 
passage deserves to be quoted in full, as follows): 
According to the [Commission for Employment Equity], Africans now hold 69% of top 
management jobs in government. But Africans within the 35-64 age cohort from 
which one would expect top managers to be drawn make up only 36% of the 
economically active population, while only 4.1% of over 20s have post-school 
training. This suggests that affirmative action has been rigorously implemented in 
the public sector regardless of levels of experience or formal qualification. Ivor 
Blumenthal, a business strategy consultant, reported in May 2014 that he was seeing 
a cleansing of white employees out of the public sector ... Very few people are willing 
to identify affirmative action as part of the problem. One who has done so is Adam 
Habib, vice chancellor and principal of the University of the Witwatersrand. In a paper 
in August 2013 he identified affirmative action and cadre deployment as among the 
causes of the 'malaise' in the public service. Professor Habib wrote: "As black staff 
were being recruited, mostly white incumbents were allowed and even encouraged 
to leave." Part of the reason for this, he said, was budget cuts. It nevertheless 
"sabotaged the skills-transfer process. The very people who could have played the 
role of mentors were no longer in the public service, and black recruits, particularly 
newly qualified young graduates, were set up for failure as they entered." Habib also 
observed that "a public service manager would be rewarded for not appointing a 
white candidate to a vacancy, even if no black candidate was available, since 
employing a white candidate would compromise that manager's transformation 
targets and annual bonus. Despite the fact that such behaviour violates the spirit of 
South Africa's constitution, the quantitative character of the performance 
management system made it logical for managers to leave vacancies unfilled rather 
than appoint qualified white candidates." One consequence, he said, is that the public 
service "is now saddled with employees who have severe deficiencies in their skill 
sets." These points need underlining. In the name of "transformation" managers in 
the public service have actually been incentivised to keep whites out for racial and 
ideological reasons. Better to leave a vacancy unfilled than to put a white person into 
it. Getting rid of whites and leaving vacancies unfilled not only hurts the whites in 
                                        
44  Kane-Berman 2014 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/why-south-africa-is-not-working. 
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question, but sets up newly qualified young black recruits for failure. Their failures in 
turn hurt countless numbers of people dependent on the public service. This might 
be described as a lose-lose-lose situation. Or as madness. Yet despite all of this, the 
government and the ANC seem determined to pursue affirmative action. [My 
emphasis] 
All of this may be quite alarmist and may very well be open to valid criticism from 
various quarters, but it would be irresponsible to label this simply as anti-establishment 
(or party-political) rhetoric, or to say that it departs much from at least a core truth 
regarding the reality of the experience of the application of transformation measures 
in the corridors of government offices across the country.45 Are we to believe that the 
judges of our highest court are blissfully unaware of this and of other such opinions46 
as are regularly expressed in the public discourse? The Constitutional Court's 
deference in Barnard to the decision of the National Commissioner of Police on 
whether there might be service delivery implications of such a practice (the non-filling 
of posts in the interests of ensuring race or gender representivity) seems to ignore 
this reality (or, at least, perception), and this is troubling not only because of the 
potentially unfairly discriminatory effects of such a de facto "policy". It also ignores 
the undoubted reality that it is quite possible that only a fraction of cases ever reach 
the courts - Stuart Woolman has characterised the problem (in another context) as 
"the structured silence of disputes that never make it to court".47 Also, what of the 
                                        
45  Even though the EEA, of course, compels designated employers in the private sector to implement 
its system of affirmative action, Dupper observes that there are differences when it comes to the 
role of merit (in this context of efficiency) between the private and public sectors: "Efficiency 
considerations in the private sector are largely self-enforcing, with financial incentives compelling 
employers to define 'merit' in a manner that advances their own interests. Private employers will 
therefore, as a matter of self-interest, sail quite close to merit principles despite the relatively 
open-ended definition of 'suitably qualified' contained in the EEA. However, because this 
mechanism is less salient in the public service, legislation has to step in to fill the void. In South 
Africa the need to balance equality with efficiency considerations finds expression in the 
Constitution. The Constitution states that the public service must be both 'broadly representative' 
and 'efficient', and the police service must discharge its responsibilities effectively." (Dupper 2008 
SAJHR 437.) 
46  McGregor quotes David Gleason as observing the following: "[The ANC] has made of it [affirmative 
action] a racial core issue inwhich white South Africans know they've been totally sidelined so far 
as permanent jobs in the public service are concerned. Those who've hung on have been 
repeatedly passed over for promotion for reasons that can only have their foundations in race … 
The result has been an extraordinary build-up in resentment and a near-collapse in some areas of 
government, notably the municipal sector where cadre deployment ... has been most often 
employed." (McGregor 2014 SA Merc LJ 91 (quoting Gleason Business Day); Sapa 2013 
http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Cadre-deployment-contradicts-NDP-DA-20130508. 
47  Woolman 2008 SALJ 11. 
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chilling effect of job advertisements clearly labelled as "employment equity" positions, 
which are so prevalent especially in respect of government jobs? How many potential 
candidates (from either the non-designated group, or from the minority designated 
groups) never apply for such positions as a result? It is probable that the problem of 
such illegitimate job reservation is in fact much more widespread than the law reports 
might suggest (even though the number of cases that have reached the courts is 
significant in itself). In this sense, it is instructive to read Pretorius's comment (in his 
analysis of the Labour Court's judgment in Barnard), which raises the spectre that the 
pursuit of representivity may lead to the devaluation of other, germane and obviously 
relevant considerations in such cases: 
The intended outcome [of the measure applied in Barnard] was to enhance the 
statistical racial balance in the particular subdivision. In this analytical scheme, 
concerns related to service delivery are of decidedly less importance than in the case 
where the organising principle of the inquiry is fairness and/or proportionality. The 
same holds for the weight the court attributed to the applicant's personal 
circumstances and the fact that the post was left temporarily vacant in the absence 
of suitable designated candidates.48 
As I have indicated above, the logical and other inconsistencies inherent in this pursuit 
of a racial balance in the workforce are just too numerous and significant for this 
concept (or such a system of target-setting) to serve as justification for ignoring any 
other relevant factors. In a case such as Barnard this applies to the issue of the 
potential impact of race-based job reservation on service delivery. (This is especially 
true where posts are left vacant purely in the interests of representivity). One must 
thus ask whether it is not highly irresponsible of the CC to simply defer to the 
Commissioner's judgment in respect of such a high profile case (especially in the light 
of the obvious paucity of the reasons provided by the Commissioner for his decision 
in this instance), as the CC is probably well aware that the (potential) problem is much 
more prevalent and that its impact extends well beyond the bounds of one specific 
case.49 Examples abound, although Coetzer's case50 may have been the high (or 
should that be low?) water mark in this respect, due to the obvious illogicality of 
leaving the relevant posts in a critical division of the Police Service vacant in the 
                                        
48  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 37. 
49  Also see Dupper 2008 SAJHR 436-437. 
50  Coetzer v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 24 ILJ 163 (LC). See, again, Dupper 2008 SAJHR 
438. 
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interests of transformation/race representation. But that does not mean that less 
blatant but potentially as invidious (and dangerous) cases of such elevation of policy 
over function and need do not present on a daily basis. Is it then not strange for van 
der Westhuizen J (for example) to tell us that Coetzer's scenario is distinguishable 
from that of Barnard, because the latter involved a less important police function than 
the former? The learned judge appears to feel that the SAPS bomb squad (Coetzer) 
does more important work than the section (in Barnard) that investigates complaints 
"concerning police services including inadequate investigations, improper police 
conduct and corruption".51 Do the names Andries Tatane, Mido Macia and Marikana 
(not to mention alleged corruption and other indiscretions – Selebi,52 Cele and Mdluli) 
ring any bells? I cannot remember the last public media report of a significant (failed) 
explosion investigated or thwarted by SAPS, but I don't need to rack my brain much 
to know that these last types of issues raise their ugly heads on almost a daily basis 
in most of our public discourse about SAPS.  
Instead of an indictment of the practice of such job reservation at the potential cost 
of service delivery, as probably being blatantly racist and destructive of the 
developmental ethos of our Constitution (and as a contemptuous slap in the face of 
Ubuntu), the judges of the CC in Barnard gave us flowery language regarding the 
importance of equality and upliftment and the plight of those disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination ... without much more of substance. I personally would have 
appreciated less of van der Westhuizen J's views regarding the value of the words of 
John F Kennedy for our no doubt understandably disillusioned "born-frees", and more 
of Jafta J's views on why the reservation of jobs "for black officers" is so undeserving 
                                        
51  See Barnard (CC) fn 211 to para 187 of van der Westhuizen J's judgment in Barnard (CC). Then 
read paras 187-188: "[P]ractically, temporary vacancies in certain positions may well be less 
damaging than in others to SAPS's ability to execute its core mandate to protect citizens. This 
differs from, for example, vacancies in the special explosives unit in Coetzer, which required highly 
trained and specialised candidates and was fundamental to SAPS' core mandate. There is nothing 
to suggest that the division [in Barnard] could not function effectively without filling this position." 
52  Jackie Selebi, of course, was the serving National Police Commissioner who made the 
determination not to recommend the appointment of Ms Barnard in the matter under review in 
Barnard (CC), and who was later charged, convicted and jailed for corruption (although (not much 
later) controversially released on medical parole after serving a fraction of his sentence). 
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of critical constitutional scrutiny.53 In my opinion, and at the very least, the CC could 
and definitely should have sent a warning shot across the bows of public service 
managers who may feel comfortable in persisting in such practices in the name of 
ensuring racial (or gender) representivity on a balance sheet űber alles.54 After all, as 
Pretorius observes, "[i]t is the function of courts to 'compel public authorities into a 
process of reasoned engagement' when a violation of rights is claimed".55 We find 
very little if any of this in the CC's judgment. In the light of the Constitution's 
requirement of "broad representation" in the public service (as mentioned earlier), are 
we to believe that the judges of our highest court are (also) unaware of the White 
Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service published in 1998, which declared 
the end prize of transformation rather unequivocally to be as follows: 
The Department [of Public Service and Administration] will, in particular, review 
national departments' and provincial administrations' progress in achieving numeric 
targets for representation, and will propose improved and refined targets with the 
aim of reaching the ultimate goal of full demographic representation. [My 
emphasis]56 
And: 
The targets in the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service are 
minimum national targets. They do not represent the ultimate goal, which is that all 
groups and levels within the Public Service should be representative of society as a 
whole. For example, the target of 2% for people with disabilities is still well below 
the 5% of people with disabilities in society as a whole; and the 30% figure for the 
                                        
53  As observed with reference to the above-mentioned Coetzer case: "The decision in Coetzer casts 
doubt on the lawfulness of what some studies indicate has become common practice in the public 
service, namely the refusal to fill positions even though qualified members of the non-favoured 
groups are available. If one takes into consideration the fact that the public service is experiencing 
an alarmingly high rate of vacancies, especially at senior management level, this judgment takes 
on additional significance." (Dupper 2008 SAJHR 438). 
54  Of course, this is official government policy: "Within national departments and provincial 
administrations, the implementation of affirmative action policies will be incorporated into 
individual managers' performance objectives and specifically, into the performance contracts 
between Directors-General and executing authorities. It is envisaged that the practice of 
developing performance contracts between the Director-General and the executing authority, also 
be extended to all managers into which affirmative action will be built as one of the criteria ... 
Central to the new affirmative action policy is the fact that responsibility for affirmative action is 
no longer the preserve of the affirmative action specialist but of every manager, supervisor and 
human resource practitioner who will be required to implement affirmative action plans and held 
responsible for these." (White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, 1998 (GN 564 in 
GG 18800 of 23 April 1998) (hereafter the White Paper), ch 4(v), p 17; para 3.1, p 33. 
55  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 38 (with reference to Kumm 2010 Law and Ethics of Human Rights 154). 
56  The White Paper ch 4(iii), p 16. 
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recruitment of women is only an interim step to achieving their full demographic 
representation.57 
We have seen that this is not what the Constitution provides. So is all this then just 
a(nother) case of "the Constitution says, but government does otherwise", in a climate 
of Nkandla and/or "Guptagate"-like untouchability? If taking judicial notice of broader 
developments in the public service were out of the question (for some reason – and I 
simply cannot agree with the reason provided by van der Westhuizen J),58 the court 
could at least have taken a more active interest in the effects of these self-same 
affirmative action policies specifically in the SA Police Service, which was actually and 
very directly before it in the dock.59 
4.3 The Constitutional Court and "representivity" in Barnard 
In the light of the central and recurring importance of the concept of (demographic) 
representivity in the practical experience of application of the constitutional principle 
of affirmative measures within the equality discourse, it was disappointing to read the 
judgments in Barnard (CC), and to note what I will describe as the very haphazard 
and superficial treatment of it by the various judges. This is surprising. As I will note 
later, it is clear that nearly all of the judges in this matter ultimately rejected Ms 
Barnard's complaints on the basis of the apparent justification for the SAPS affirmative 
action measure – the pursuit of representivity. For now, though, I will just include a 
                                        
57  The White Paper para 1.10, p 23. 
58  At Barnard (CC) para 189: "[C]ourts should be wary of making evaluations about service delivery 
– in the context of affirmative measures – from a distance. Without proper evidence or specialist 
institutional knowledge, it may be difficult for a court to draw conclusions about the precise impact 
a policy, an appointment, or even a vacancy will have on service delivery. This is the reason for 
the National Commissioner's wide discretionary powers, particularly in the context of affirmative 
measures, to appoint a candidate or to keep a post vacant. In this case, there is not enough 
evidence for this Court to impugn the decision on the issue of service delivery. It cannot be said 
that it was disproportionate for the National Commissioner to rank representivity higher than the 
possible impact on service delivery in this case." Is it really too much to ask a court to consider 
the possibility (the strong probability) that leaving a post vacant would in some way negatively 
impact on delivery of the service that the incumbent of such a post would have been expected to 
provide?  
59  See, for example, the following observation: "Organisational culture, brain drain and resistance to 
change are some of the major challenges facing affirmative action [in the SAPS] ... It is clear that 
there is progress in the implementation of affirmative action and employment equity in the South 
African Police Service but some drastic steps need to be taken to prevent mass exodus of 
employees, especially those with special skills. A robust and extensive retention strategy is needed 
to address this mass exodus." (Montesh 2010 SACJ 77.) 
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brief montage of the few instances where the judges referred to representivity, and I 
will then briefly examine whether we can find any real guidance on the meaning and 
role of this concept within the continuing affirmative action debate. 
One possible reason for the rather disappointing coverage of the concept of 
representivity in Barnard (CC) may be due to the complainant herself (or her legal 
team). Moseneke ACJ tells us that, in oral argument, Ms Barnard "jettisoned her 
detailed attack against the Employment Equity Plan and the Instruction as unjustifiable 
infringements of her equality protection because they amounted to racial quotas or 
racial norming or racial profiling".60 However, in the light of the importance of the 
concept (and how the Employment Equity Act fits within the broader ideology of the 
demographic transformation of the public service and our other workplaces), I would 
suggest that the court was morally bound to consider this much more meaningfully 
and in more detail. 
Be that as it may, the first real encounter we have with the role of representivity in 
Barnard (CC) is found in paragraph 66 of Moseneke ACJ's majority opinion, although 
the learned judge's views on its role are less than clear. He tells us that the 
employment equity plan in this case obliged the National Commissioner to take steps 
to achieve the targets set, and that the Commissioner was "within his right and indeed 
duty to take steps that would achieve the set targets".61 While the judge tells us that 
"the implementation of a valid plan may amount to job reservation if applied too 
rigidly",62 he was of the opinion that this was not the case here, for the following 
reason: 
[O]ver-representation of white women at salary level 9 was indeed pronounced. That 
plainly meant that the Police Service had not pursued racial targets at the expense 
of other relevant considerations. It had appointed white female employees despite 
equity targets. Had the Police Service not done so, white female employees would 
not have been predominant in any of the levels including salary level 9 nor would 
they have been able to retain their posts.63 
                                        
60  Barnard (CC) para 54. 
61  Barnard (CC) para 66. 
62  Barnard (CC) para 66. 
63  Barnard (CC) para 66. 
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This is interesting, in two ways. In the first place, Moseneke ACJ implicitly endorses 
demographic representivity in the context of target – setting (a specific group can only 
be "over-represented", and such "over-representation" can be "pronounced" only if 
measured against some standard – and demographic representation in terms of the 
population demographics was the express standard employed by the SAPS). In the 
second place, the judge's remarks appear to provide some distance between the 
"equity targets" (an affirmative action measure) and past unfair discrimination as a 
cause for any such "over-representation". He tells us that SAPS has appointed white 
female applicants despite such targets (ie he is not concerned that their over-
representation is due to their past undue preference in employment, but rather he 
observes that even after the implementation of an affirmative action measure they 
were still appointed). On the role or importance of representivity, however, we find 
nothing more in the majority opinion in Barnard (CC). 
Van der Westhuizen J came teasingly close to providing us with a clearer picture of 
the meaning and the proper role of representivity, but this also (I would submit) 
eventually came to nought: 
Before focusing specifically on the facts of this case, it must be pointed out that 
equality can certainly mean more than representivity. Affirmative measures seek to 
address the fact that some candidates were not afforded the same opportunities as 
their peers, because of past unfair discrimination on various grounds. By focusing on 
representivity only, a measure's implementation may thwart other equality concerns. 
For example, if a population group makes up 2 or 3 percent of the national 
demographic, then, in an environment with few employees, the numerical target for 
the group would be very small or even non-existent. If a candidate from this group 
is not appointed because the small target has already been met, this may unjustly 
ignore the hardships and disadvantage faced by the candidate or category of persons, 
not to mention the candidate's possible qualifications, experience and ability. 
And:  
"Although equality can manifest in various forms, in the context of this case it takes 
the form of representivity. By appointing Ms Barnard, her designated group would 
have been significantly over-represented and her appointment would have 
aggravated racial inequality."64  
                                        
64  Barnard (CC) paras 149-150. 
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It is hard to find anything of real value in these quoted sections of the judgment in 
order to assist our determination of the link, if any, between representivity and 
equality. More problematically, these thoughts are also ambiguous, and read rather 
confusingly.65 The statement that "equality can certainly mean more than 
representivity" tells us that equality does not equal representivity, and that these two 
concepts are simply not the same thing. But then we are told that "equality can 
manifest in various forms, in the context of this case it takes the form of 
representivity". So, is representivity then actually a form of equality? Or isn't it? 
Also, the judge's example highlights the clear disconnect between representivity based 
on population demographics and the recognition of past disadvantage as well as the 
pursuit of (substantive) equality. There is, as per his example, not necessarily any 
correlation between the two, and I will suggest that in a scenario such as that referred 
to in the example the equating of representivity and demographics to (assumptions 
of) disadvantage would not only serve to further disadvantage the relevant member 
of a designated group (the point the judge seems to be making), but it would also 
allow an employer to ignore true (even proven) disadvantage and to refrain from 
pursuing affirmative action as a constitutionally-mandated form of remedial or 
restitutionary action in favour of the relevant group/member of a group. Surely this 
kind of outcome – compare what happened in Naidoo - must be absurd (perverse) 
when considered against the backdrop of the provisions of the equality guarantee, 
and the necessity for the pursuit of substantive as opposed to formal equality prized 
so highly by our Constitutional Court. In paragraph 183 of the judgment, van der 
Westhuizen J again confuses the reader with the statement that "[t[]he goal of 
equality is being promoted in this case through representivity". In the context of his 
(disappointing, as observed earlier) consideration of the potential impact of the 
measure on service delivery, the judge then also refers to "[w]hen a balance does 
have to be struck between efficient service delivery and equality in the form of 
                                        
65  Which may not be surprising, considering the experience of the transformation agenda in the 
public service (at least). As Wessels observes, in his analysis of the policy documents used in this 
context (specifically the 1995 White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service): "[T]here is 
confusion in the application of related concepts such as 'equality', 'employment equity', 'equal 
employment opportunity', 'affirmative action' and representativeness in the public service because 
these words are sometimes used as if they were synonyms." (Wessels 2005 Politeia 126). 
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representivity …"66 – again, is he saying that representivity is a form of equality? To 
just confuse things even more, it would seem, he then continues to note that in Ms 
Barnard's case "any possible negative impact on service delivery was overshadowed 
by the fact that her appointment would have significantly aggravated unequal 
representation at salary level 9".67 I will be generous and attribute this use of the word 
"unequal" to a typo; if not, what would this terminology imply? "Equal" representation 
would require all race groups (to just use race as an example) to be, well, equally 
represented in the workplace.68 This again would be something very different from 
what the EEA requires. 
We also do not find much guidance in Barnard (CC) about the meaning, role and 
importance of representivity (or its interaction with equity and equality) amongst the 
other judgments of the court. Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ, in their separate 
concurring judgment with that of Moseneke ACJ, had the following to say: 
If a decision-maker does not justify how he or she balances the important 
considerations of representivity and service delivery, remedial measures will suffer 
an invidious gloss. A decision-maker could prize representivity over service delivery 
without sufficient regard to the specific facts of a case. This would suggest that 
representivity is always more important than the quality of service provided by a 
public body. But this is a false choice. There is no evidence that we must sacrifice 
the quality of our public bodies to achieve the important goals of representivity and 
to redress past disadvantage. [My emphasis]69 
Apart from telling us that representivity is both an important "consideration" and 
"goal", what we find here is an indication that it is something different from redress. 
The learned judges are at pains to refer to the "important goals of representivity and 
to redress past disadvantage". So, upon my reading, these are two separate and 
different concepts. Of course, common sense and a dictionary also tell us that these 
are not one and the same thing (and, as mentioned, we see them also textually 
separated or distinguished in section 2 of the EEA). Finally, Cameron J et al also seem 
                                        
66  Barnard (CC) para 186. 
67  Barnard (CC) para 188. 
68  Intriguingly, this same typo also turns up in the judgment of Moseneke ACJ in Barnard (CC), where 
he discusses the scheme of the EEA (in para 40): "Designated employers must ensure that suitably 
qualified employees from designated groups are equally represented in each working category of 
the designated employer." 
69  Barnard (CC) para 110. 
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to imply that there is some link between representivity and the redress of past 
disadvantage, but just like so many others (including the drafters of plans and policies 
on public service transformation) they seem to base this on some unspoken 
assumption. I would suggest that this is evident in their following observation: 
[The National Commissioner] was entitled to prefer racial representivity over gender 
representivity, provided he had a justification for that decision. In other words, it is 
not necessarily an injury to dignity to view a person only through the lens of one 
ground listed in section 9(3), provided the reason for doing so is to redress historical 
inequality.70  
The underlying assumption (that preferring one form or manifestation of representivity 
over another requires justification, and that such justification would/must be the 
redress of past disadvantage) is clear; whether there is any real basis for it is less 
clear. And that is not really the point. The point is that these judges owe us (and Ms 
Barnard) more of an explanation, and less in the way of having to draw inferences. 
So, from all of this the most I can say is that Barnard (CC) tells us the following: 
1) equality does not equal representivity, and these two concepts are simply not 
the same thing; 
2) even though that may be the case, representivity may be a form of equality; 
and 
3) while representivity is an important goal and consideration, it is something 
distinct from the redress of past disadvantage.71 
At best then, from these rather opaque statements one can take the following: 
Considering that this same court in Van Heerden told us that a legitimate affirmative 
action measure is one that is aimed at and designed to redress past disadvantage in 
the interests of thus promoting (substantive) equality, the pursuit of representivity has 
something to do with this (we're not exactly sure what that is), but it does not, in fact, 
equate to this purpose. It is therefore, clearly, something that has been added by the 
EEA to the Constitution's conception of legitimate remedial measures in the pursuit of 
                                        
70  Barnard (CC) para 116-117. 
71  The Supreme Court of Appeal has also indicated that representivity is not synonymous with fairness 
– see Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 2008 6 SA 522 (SCA) para 28. Husain writes 
that representivity is not synonymous with transformation (but an aspect of it) – see Husain 2013 
De Rebus 3. 
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equality, but something that the highest court in our land cannot (or will not) quantify 
for our elucidation. At best – and acknowledging by implication that representivity 
involves the pursuit of a numbers game – the CC tells us that rigid enforcement of 
quotas is illegitimate. Both the Supreme Court of Appeal72 and the Labour Court73 
agree (even if the wording of the EEA on this issue is ambiguous at best74). But beyond 
that we are still left in the dark as to the constitutional role and legitimacy of this 
numbers game. 
By now it must be abundantly clear that I have a rather large bee in my bonnet over 
representivity. Others may argue, however, that this lack of clarity (could it be 
dissembling) by judges is all fine and well; that the Constitutional Court was not called 
upon to provide us with any definitive guidance on the meaning, etc of (demographic) 
representation in the context of our equality discourse. They may argue that this is 
much the same as the issue of the meaning and role of quotas (which Moseneke ACJ 
told us, expressly, did not require examination in Barnard – of course, I do not agree). 
But they would miss the point. What was said about representivity by the various 
judges can hardly be classified as being obiter, if we consider how the separate 
concurring judgments all seemed to, ultimately, base their approval of SAPS's 
treatment of the complainant in this matter on its pursuit of (demographic) 
representivity in its workforce. 
A case in point, and one issue that stands out for me, is that even van der Westhuizen 
J, who arguably (and as noted above) was the single member of this court most willing 
to consider the impact of the measure on those disadvantaged by it, relied on the 
promotion of representivity to justify the potential impact of the implementation of the 
measure on Ms Barnard's dignity. The judge formulated two questions (or factors) to 
assess the impact on the complainant within this context, and then tells us that neither 
                                        
72  Navsa JA, in Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS 2014 2 SA 1 (SCA) para 23 (hereinafter Barnard (SCA): 
"The most virulent opponents of [measures to overcome historical obstacles and disadvantages 
and providing equal opportunities for all] will be hard put to argue against its noble purpose. 
Likewise, the most ardent supporters of such measures, I venture, would find it difficult to argue 
with any conviction that the end result [of such measures] can be obtained by the mechanical 
application of formulae and numerical targets." 
73  See Naidoo para 209. 
74  See s 15(3) of the EEA. 
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of the two negative impacts hinted at by these questions had actually materialised – 
importantly, note that the reasoning here relies almost exclusively on the promotion 
of representivity and/or the role that the concept played in the design and 
implementation of the SAPS measure at issue in this case: 
Was the impact on Ms Barnard's dignity reasonable and justifiable in light of the goal 
of substantive equality? I consider two factors. First, she treated [sic] as a mere 
means to achieve an end? Did the decision reduce her to a member of an underclass 
to the extent that her place in society and in the Constitution is denigrated? Even the 
perception of this may threaten the pursuit of our constitutional goal of a society in 
which everyone, regardless of their differences, is equally valued and at home. 
Second, does the measure's implementation amount to an absolute barrier to her 
advancement? If a measure is used to obliterate a person's chances at progressing 
in her chosen career, it would not pass constitutional muster. It would constitute an 
impermissible barrier to an individual's ability to "develop [her] humanity [and] 
'humanness' to the full extent of its potential". The Act indicates a cognisance of the 
dangers of establishing "an absolute barrier to the prospective or continued 
employment or advancement of people". 
Neither is present in this case. Ms Barnard failed to secure appointment because 
there was over-representation of people from her designated group. Had this over-
representation not been present, the policy would not be a bar – let alone an absolute 
one – to her (or any other similarly qualified white woman's) appointment. Ms 
Barnard's career advancement within SAPS was not destroyed. The Employment 
Equity Plan has specific targets for different occupational levels and is flexibly used 
to cater for over- and under-representation. This flexibility ensures that she can be 
promoted to a higher occupational level should representation targets allow. By the 
time the case reached this Court, she had been promoted, albeit to a different 
department. The goal of equality is being promoted in this case through 
representivity.' [My emphasis]75 
Is it just me, or is there something rather incongruous in this reasoning? Does this 
amount to saying the following: "There is a measure here that is being challenged on 
the basis that it does not allow for the appointment of someone who is white. Ms X 
was not appointed because she was white. This is not a problem, however, because 
if she had been black she would have been appointed."? I am probably wrong; van 
der Westhuizen J is an eminent jurist, and one of the judges of our highest court. But 
surely we deserve more clarity than this.76 
                                        
75  Barnard (CC) paras 180-183 (footnote references omitted). 
76  Thomas Sowell would, I believe, have responded as follows to these and other examples of the 
failure of the judges in Barnard (CC) to use clear language and explain what they mean so that 
others can understand: "Whatever definition - and accompanying set of policies - one believes in, 
a serious discussion of racial discrimination or of racial issues in general requires that we lay our 
cards face up on the table and not hide behind ambiguous and shifting words that render any 
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That being said, however, and without wanting to sound overly simplistic in the 
analysis of this judgment, van der Westhuizen J spent fifteen paragraphs discussing 
the role of dignity in this case, and then found that it was trumped by representivity. 
And yet, as said earlier, the learned judge does not spend even one paragraph 
explaining to us the meaning and relevance of representivity in the application of an 
affirmative action measure in order to promote substantive equality. And this, to me, 
is especially strange when one considers the central importance that he attached to 
the balancing exercise that is inherent in constitutional adjudication (and which, in 
fact, forms the basis for his suggested standard of the review of affirmative action 
measures which should include the consideration of proportionality): 
No [constitutional] provisions may be interpreted in isolation and no right protected 
and enforced without regard to other rights. Especially the exercise of one 
constitutional right may often have to be balanced against another. Courts are 
regularly called upon to do so thoughtfully and candidly. To a considerable extent, 
this is what constitutional adjudication is about.77 
Yet we do not find an explanation of the meaning, content and proper (constitutional) 
role of the central concept or interest which the judge feels trumped Ms Barnard's 
right to dignity in this case. As a reader of the judgment I do not find it more helpful 
than the extremely one-sided judgment of Mlambo J in Barnard (LAC), which, as 
already noted, Malan has characterised as "nothing but a dreadful miscarriage of 
justice".78 The big difference, of course, is that even though we are no closer to 
discerning the meaning of representivity within the equality jurisprudence, the concept 
has apparently been given constitutional approval by the judges of our highest court. 
No future judge, outside of this court, who might feel more inclined to interrogate 
these issues, can now overturn this implicit approval of representivity as an apparent 
(although highly suspect) new constitutional goal. The drafters of the EEA (and the 
SAPS and doubtless a large number of other human resource managers in the public 
service) must be delighted. I am less so. 
                                        
attempt at dialog futile and ultimately poisonous." (Sowell "Discrimination, Economics and Culture" 
168). 
77  Barnard (CC) para 161 (footnote references omitted). 
78  Malan 2014 De Jure 125. 
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The vagueness of the language and reasoning of these judges is sorely problematic, 
not only because of the lack of clarity that Barnard (CC) has provided us on all the 
above-mentioned issues and questions, but also because such uncertainty also leaves 
just too much room for dishonesty. We have seen that the Constitutional Court found 
that the SAPS measure did not constitute an absolute bar to the appointment of Ms 
Barnard or any other white female. It is interesting, considering this, that the reality 
seems to have been quite different. In a recent speech the CEO of Solidarity,79 Dirk 
Hermann, recounted the following exchange that occurred in testimony before the 
Labour Court in Barnard (during the leading of evidence of a SAPS human resources 
professional, Superintendent Ramathoka): 
According to Ramathoka, an interviewing panel was not allowed to recommend 
people from the non-designated group if that group happened to be overrepresented. 
People from that group could apply for a position, but they would not be 
recommended. 
"What is the point in allowing them or inviting them to apply?" asked Advocate 
Grogan. 
And then followed Ramathoka's astounding reply that, in terms of the Employment 
Equity Act, an absolute ban on applications was not allowed. Whites could therefore 
submit an application; however, strict enforcement of the SAPS's plan meant they 
would not be recommended. 
"That's cynical," Grogan said. 
The judge was also confused: "Sorry, I just need to clarify something. 
Superintendent, I am confused. Are you testifying that the policy and process of the 
SAPS, once a plan has been issued which shows an overrepresentation in a particular 
position, is an absolute rule? That the SAPS will not, and may not, appoint a person 
from a non-designated group to that position, as an absolute rule?" 
"It is an absolute rule, my lord," Ramathoka replied.80 
It appears – and this is worrying - that the judges of our Constitutional Court may be 
easily fooled. It might be apt to quote the words of American economist Thomas 
Sowell – referring to affirmative action for African-Americans as "the grand fraud". 
This was expressed, of course, in the American context, but see if you can spot its 
relevance closer to home: 
                                        
79  The trade union that took Ms Barnard's matter to court (and has also led the litigation in other 
prominent affirmative action disputes). 
80  Hermann 2014 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639?oid=680718&sn=Detai
l&pid=71639. 
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No issue has been more saturated with dishonesty than the issue of racial quotas 
and preferences … Many defenders of affirmative action are not even honest enough 
to admit that they are talking about quotas and preferences, even though everyone 
knows that that is what affirmative action amounts to in practice … When any policy 
can only be defended by lies and duplicity, there is something fundamentally wrong 
with that policy. Virtually every argument in favor of affirmative action is 
demonstrably false. It is the grand fraud of our time … Affirmative action is great for 
black millionaires but it has done little or nothing for most people in the ghetto. Most 
minority business owners who get preferences in government contracts have net 
worth's of more than one million dollars. One of the big barriers to any rational 
discussion of affirmative action is that many of those who are for or against it are for 
or against the theory or the rationales behind group preferences and quotas. As for 
facts, the defenders simply lie.81 
5 The recent amendments to the EEA 
The Employment Equity Act was recently amended for the first time since its inception 
in 1998, by means of the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 (which came 
into force on 1 August 2014 – nearly to the hour exactly one month before the handing 
down of the Constitutional Court's judgment in Barnard). The amendments brought 
changes to various important provisions of the Act, ranging from substantive matters 
(such as the definition of the designated groups under Chapter III and both the 
definition of prohibition on unfair discrimination and the burden of proof in claims of 
unfair discrimination in terms of section 6) to procedural ones (such as the assessment 
of compliance with the Act and the reporting requirements). For the present purposes, 
the most relevant of the amendments relate to the assessment of compliance with the 
provisions of the affirmative action chapter, specifically in respect of the contents of 
section 42 of the Act. Earlier in this piece I briefly recounted the (pre-amendment) 
provisions of this section, and I made the point that its scheme facilitated (and, indeed, 
gave definition to) the Act's concept of the pursuit of "equitable representation" with 
reference to the foremost compliance criterion in respect of affirmative action target-
setting – demographics. The amendments to section 42 are, in this respect, extremely 
significant. For the present purposes I will focus only on these, very briefly and 
extremely superficially.82 
                                        
81  Sowell 2003 http://capitalismmagazine.com/2003/04/the-grand-fraud-affirmative-action-for-
blacks/. 
82  As contained in s 16 of Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013. 
AM LOUW   PER / PELJ 2015(18)3 
 
699 
I will not mention all of the amendments to this section but, judged holistically, the 
most important is that of the scrapping of most of the criteria previously listed for the 
assessment of compliance by a designated employer. It should – at this stage of 
reading this piece – come as no surprise that the legislature has opted to retain only 
one of the previous criteria (with the wording slightly altered) as contained in the 
section, namely the "extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the 
different designated groups are equitably represented within each occupational level 
in that employer's workforce in relation to the demographic profile of the national and 
regional economically active population".83 The Amendment Act has, thus, removed 
all of the workplace-related factors referred to earlier as contained in the section. 
Note, of course, that in the earlier discussion of quotas and the illegitimacy of the rigid 
pursuit of numerical targets, these were the only reality-based factors that a 
designated employer could raise in order to ensure flexibility and consideration of its 
actual requirements and circumstances (if it came to a failure to reach numerical 
targets). While including a number of new factors (all relating to "reasonable steps 
taken by a designated employer" to do certain things), as well as a catch-all ("any 
other prescribed factor"), the overwhelming and inevitable conclusion is that the 
legislature has clearly decided to tighten up the demographic representivity agenda 
pursued in terms of the Act by making it clear for everyone to see that demographics 
are, and will remain, first prize. Designated employers are now left with little doubt (if 
any remained) about the purpose of the Act and the objective of the legislature in its 
conception of the numbers game and what is expected in its implementation. 
These amendments, obviously, did not feature in the litigation in Barnard. If we will 
see any future litigation under the Act - as we must - they will doubtless play a role in 
further cementing the illegitimate agenda of the Act and our apparent, inevitable, slide 
into a situation where the term "affirmative action" (as understood by ordinary South 
Africans) might, as more and more signs seem to suggest, equate to the pursuit and 
condonation of what may very well come down to little more than institutionalised 
racism under a gossamer veil of "transformation". To go old school for a moment: in 
the words of Johnny Mercer, when accentuating the positive and eliminating the 
                                        
83  As contained in the new s 42(1)(a) of the EEA. 
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negative, we need to "latch on to the affirmative" - but "don't mess with mister in-
between".84 The judges of our Constitutional Court, it would seem - when casting their 
votes over the legitimacy of the Employment Equity Act in this whole scheme of things 
– may very well have briefly lost sight of this last warning. In our constitutional equality 
paradigm, I would characterise this Act as the very personification of a rather shifty-
eyed Mr In-Between – caught somewhere between the constitutional principle of 
affirmative action and the governmental ideology of the numbers game. It is worthy, 
if nothing more, of constant and very critical watch; and someone should have the 
intestinal fortitude to mess with it, sooner rather than later.  
6 Conclusion 
What for me emerges quite clearly when one considers the subject matter of this piece 
is that we are dealing here with two quite distinct and probably irreconcilable concepts. 
The first is that of (substantive) equality, which is sanctioned, and, indeed, demanded 
by our Constitution. Our understanding of the role of affirmative action in this context 
is the redressing of disadvantage caused by past unfair discrimination through the 
means of remedial and restitutionary measures sanctioned under the Bill of Rights, in 
order to promote the achievement of the full and equal enjoyment of those hard-
fought fundamental rights for all who share this beautiful country. The second is that 
of (demographic) representivity, which finds its only purported legitimacy in the 
transformational nature and objectives of our Constitution. If 'transformation' means 
to change things (possibly, cosmetically),85 then yes, government's virulent pursuit of 
representivity will achieve this (if it has not done so yet). Whether this last is what the 
drafters of our Constitution had in mind (or whether the "transformed' South African 
society we are in the process of creating is the one envisaged by them86 – although 
we should not lose sight of the long history of the ANC's National Democratic 
                                        
84  Johnny Mercer and the Pied Pipers Accentuate the Positive, Capitol Records (© 1945). 
85  The Oxford dictionary defines "transformation" as "a marked change in form, nature, or 
appearance". 
86  As Dupper notes, some of the burning questions regarding affirmative action (although not 
necessarily the same questions I have tried to address here) raise "important questions about the 
society we wish to become, and it matters enormously which choices are made" – see Dupper 
2008 SAJHR 443. 
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Revolution87) is a very different question. One thing that does stand out, however, is 
that representivity has virtually nothing to do with equality (just as it, probably, has 
                                        
87  Some of the issues touched on in this piece are placed more clearly in context when one considers 
the analysis by Roger Southall regarding the development of the ruling party's National Democratic 
Revolution (or NDR). He explains (writing in 2008, prior to the start of the Zuma era): "[C]apture 
of the state and 'internal decolonisation' [by an ANC coming into power in a post-apartheid South 
Africa] would require, both in terms of social justice and the needs of the economy, the rapid 
growth of the black middle class – and indeed, the expansion of a class of black capitalists. After 
all, democratisation could not stop with the state: it also demanded popular control of the 
'commanding heights of the economy'. It was not a huge step for this to be translated by influential 
forces within the party after 1994 into a call for 'demographic representivity', or for the 'blackening' 
of the corporate sector, a demand to which large scale capital was happy to accede (albeit within 
limits, and over time). In terms of the NDR, a black capitalist class is always suspect. Because its 
rise is dependent in part upon co-operation with established capital and upon opportunities 
provided by the state, it is likely to resort to corruption and to develop into a 'parasitic bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie'. To counter this, the NDR must cleave to the disciplines of 'patriotism'; that is, to 
remember its social obligations to the impoverished community from which it has come and remain 
guided by the ANC. However, while the notion of a 'patriotic bourgeoisie' has always sat uneasily 
with Marxian theories of class exploitation, its effective dilution since 1994 into the demand for 
'representivity' has allowed for the upward mobility of blacks as individuals within the corporate 
sector to be presented as commensurate with the furtherance of the NDR. While the ANC's 
partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the SACP may cling to more 
radical, activist interpretations of the NDR, the ANC leadership under Mbeki was to become 
increasingly bold in asserting that the ANC has never been a socialist organisation, and by 
implication, that the blackening of capitalism through BEE will be the revolution's end point. 
However, the problem facing an emergent black capitalist class was its lack of capital and capitalist 
expertise. The solutions were essentially twofold. First, from the moment it moved into office, the 
ANC viewed its control over the civil service and parastatals (which accounted for around 15 per 
cent of GDP) as the instrument for extending its control over 'the commanding heights of the 
economy'. This included the strategy of transferring state-owned enterprises on discounted terms 
to blacks via privatisation. In the event, this did not prove to be particularly successful simply 
because the amounts of capital required for the purchase of all but 'non-core' assets were too 
large for aspirant black capitalists to raise. In practice, therefore, the state sector served as the 
training ground in corporate management, knowledge and the expertise required by aspirant black 
capitalists for launching themselves into the private sector. Second, the ANC's demand for 
'representivity' drew a response from large scale capital that was simultaneously creative and 
defensive. On the one hand, conglomerates proved responsive to the ANC's 'deployment' of 
influential senior personnel to the corporate sector, recognising that whilst they had the financial 
capital to fund BEE, they also needed the 'political capital' that only ANC loyalists could provide. 
On the other, when from around 2000, the ANC's BEE strategy became more assertive, large 
capital responded by pre-emptively negotiating 'transformation charters' which established targets 
for black share ownership, management, employment, and skills training by 2014. Today, most 
individual industrial sector charters are in the process of being subordinated to a generic code 
introduced by the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003. This may result in a 
change in the face which corporates present over time. However, while this will be welcomed by 
the ANC, a possible accompaniment may be a weakening of the commitment of the black business 
class to the party as a force for transformation in favour of its reduction to a vehicle for promoting 
their material advance. It is clear that the NDR prioritizes control of the state as the essential 
instrument for transformation. However, in the context of South Africa's new democracy, this has 
posed the awkward necessities of funding the party and thrust it into a maw of controversy." 
(Southall 2008 Rev Afr Polit Econ 284-286.) 
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nothing to do with unfair discrimination88). I suggest that it is time for our politicians 
and legal textbooks, and even the judges of our highest court, to stop implying that it 
does. 
I should like to call on the legal fraternity to take a more active interest in these 
developments, which affect us all89 (and will doubtless affect many of our children – 
possibly a whole generation, at least90 - for years to come). If there is something that, 
doubtless, all of us trained in the law inherently abhor, it is injustice. There is one 
thing, though, that I think we all abhor even more: a clear injustice clothed as justice. 
The apartheid state, after all, plodded along quite successfully for many years within 
a system of parliamentary sovereignty and dodgy but ostensibly legitimate laws. Apart 
from the issue of affirmative action, I did not really in the preceding discussion touch 
on some of the most controversial aspects of our current government's drive for 
demographic representivity and for the race-based transformation of society, public 
                                        
88  American economics professor, Thomas Sowell (who has done more empirical research on this 
subject than I have), explains this well in this context: "Many people believe that differences in life 
chances or differences in socioeconomic results are unusual, suspicious, and probably indicative 
of biased or malign social processes that operate to the detriment of particular racial and other 
groups. While there have certainly been numerous examples of discrimination - in the traditional 
sense of applying different rules or standards to different groups - in the United States and in 
other countries around the world, that is very different from claiming the converse, that group 
differences in prospects or outcomes must derive from this source. Intergroup differences have 
been the rule, not the exception, in countries around the world and throughout centuries of history 
… It would be no feat to fill a book with statistical disparities that have nothing to do with 
discrimination. What would be a real feat would be to get people to realize that correlation is not 
causation - especially when the numbers fit their preconceptions ... Some statistical disparities are 
of course caused by discrimination, just as some deaths are caused by cancer. But one cannot 
infer discrimination from statistics any more than one can infer cancer whenever someone dies. 
The absence of corroborating evidence of discrimination has forced some into claiming that the 
discrimination has been so 'subtle,' 'covert,' or 'unconscious' as to leave no tangible evidence. But 
this method of arguing - where both the presence and the absence of empirical evidence prove 
the same thing - would prove anything about anything, anywhere and any time." Sowell 
"Discrimination, Economics and Culture" 169-170. 
89  Especially seeing that, well, we as a fraternity must, of course, also be demographically 
representative. Former Justice Minister Jeff Radebe's answer to a question in Parliament on the 
then Legal Practice Bill (18 October 2011): "The legal profession is still not representative of the 
demographics of South Africa and entry into the profession is, in many instances, determined by 
outdated, unnecessary, and overly restrictive prescripts. Access to legal services, especially by the 
poor, is limited ... It might be said that the Bill democratises the regulatory structures which, in 
turn, will pave the way in order to take the transformation agenda to its logical conclusion." 
(Radebe 2011 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/legal-profession-must-be-
demographically-represent.) 
90  Compare a university admissions affirmative action policy in India, which was implemented 
expressly as a temporary measure in 1949 and is still in force today – see Sowell Thomas Sowell 
Reader 288-289. 
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institutions and the economy (including the much-maligned broad-based black 
economic empowerment policies).91 I refrained from doing so in the firm conviction 
that the redress of past disadvantage, especially in a society so scarred by systemic 
unfair discrimination on the basis of race and other arbitrary grounds, is a valid (and 
admirable) constitutional objective on its own. Leaving aside the practical and other 
objections regarding implementation, policies relating to, for example, the 
redistribution of wealth, land reform and the like are all valid manifestations of this 
(which is why I think no thinking South African can seriously and validly ignore the 
political platform of Mr. Malema's Economic Freedom Fighters). What is more 
worrying, however, is that when it comes to the application of affirmative action in 
employment (and in other, even more problematic contexts, such as sport), the means 
chosen significantly impacts on the rights of those specifically excluded by such 
measures (the "previously advantaged"). Even this would not be overly troublesome, 
though, if it occurred under the flag of redress as a valid constitutional objective. In 
the matter of the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, it does so 
by invoking that other very valid constitutional objective – the achievement of 
substantive equality – but it does so really only in name.92 
We have seen how the Act by definition elevates demographic statistics to the status 
of an ultimate objective when it comes to affirmative action. Instead of identifying the 
redress of past disadvantage as a separate and independent constitutional objective, 
                                        
91  As I write this, there are continuous reports in the media about government's drive for 
transformation of the South African economy towards demographic representivity. The deputy-
president, Cyril Ramaphosa, was quoted following a speech at the annual conference of the 
Association of Black Securities and Investment Professionals: "Government needed to work 
towards radical economic transformation and the economy needed to reflect the country's 
demography. 'Broad-based black economic development, skills development, supplier 
development and preferential procurement are parts of the package of measures we've employed 
over the past two decades to achieve this objective'." (Sapa 2014 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014/09/25/transformation-must-continue-ramaphosa.) 
92  Which leads to some commentators seemingly losing sight of the constitutional framework for 
affirmative action in the face of the Act's obsession with the numbers: "It is apparent from the 
case law that some degree of consideration, planning and rationality must precede the 
implementation of affirmative action measures. It is not sufficient for an employer to merely assert 
that a measure amounts to an affirmative action measure. By the same token it is not necessary 
that affirmative action measures be part of an employment equity plan that complies with the 
provisions of the EEA. The fact that a measure is: (a) intended to contribute to the objective of 
equitable representation; and (b) capable of doing so; should be sufficient." (Partington and Van 
der Walt 2005 Obiter 602). 
AM LOUW   PER / PELJ 2015(18)3 
 
704 
the Constitutional Court has told us repeatedly, and quite adamantly (in its 
interpretation of the text of the Bill of Rights), that affirmative action resorts squarely 
under the equality right; it is not an exception to the guarantee of equal protection 
for all, but part and parcel of the pursuit of substantive equality. This complicates 
matters somewhat when one considers the impact of some forms of affirmative action 
measures (notably those that are in line only with the stated purpose of the EEA) on 
those excluded from its benefits. While some judges of the CC reminded us in Barnard 
that "[f]requently the goals of transformation are more important" than the 
impairment of the dignity of these souls,93 this seems to ignore the fact that our 
Constitution also pursues very important goals other than transformation. The 
promotion of dignity and equality (also in the sense of equal worth for all), non-
racialism and non-sexism are all expressly written into our Constitution and comprise 
equally important fundamental values which underlie it.94 
If the legislature intends to create a stratification of classes of citizens in the interests 
of redressing the disadvantage of those unfairly discriminated against in the past, they 
may do so by all means, but do so without subterfuge and with the realisation that 
ultimately this will promote a different (although possibly still valid) constitutional 
objective. [It will also, as mentioned, most probably create a quite different society to 
that envisioned by the drafters of our Constitution. We will, after all, very soon be able 
to fly the friendly skies assured that the ladies and gents in the cockpit are "fully 
transformed"95 - I think George Orwell would have loved this!] But do not clothe 
                                        
93  Per Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ in Barnard (CC) para 89, note 93. 
94  I have not, in this piece, paid any real attention to the issue of the implications of the EEA's 
numbers game for non-racialism (and the fact that the EEA has been criticised for its re-
introduction/continuation of racial classification). While the point has been made that it would 
probably be unrealistic and disingenuous to ignore the reality of South African society as still being 
extremely race-conscious (see, for example, Dupper 2008 SAJHR, and the authorities referred to 
there) it bears mentioning that the nature (and effects) of the ANC's pursuit of the ideology of 
demographic representivity is out of kilter with its own guidelines for the negotiation and eventual 
creation of a South African Constitution – compare the following, as expressed by a then member 
of the ANC's legal and constitutional committee in 1989: "[T]he [Constitutional Guidelines for a 
Democratic South Africa, published by the African National Congress in March 1988] seek to protect 
the individual human rights of all South Africans. They also seek to protect the individual's religion, 
language, and culture - all essentially 'group' rights - but without the poisonous sting of racism or 
exclusive ethnicity." (Masemola 1989-1990 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 53.) The scenario of the Naidoo 
case (which I referred to extensively earlier) again provides a poignant counterpoint here. 
95  A June 2013 posting on the FW de Klerk Foundation's website mentions that South African Airways 
has, reportedly, scrapped an absolute bar on the recruitment of white male cadet pilots. A 
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measures that directly and intentionally disadvantage certain classes or categories of 
persons (and may for all intents and purposes reduce them to little more than 
collateral damage) as actually promoting equality when they do so at the terrible 
expense of human dignity for some. This our Constitutional Court recognised well 
before it was first faced with affirmative action in Van Heerden: 
The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not only to 
avoid discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged groups. It 
seeks more than that. At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a 
recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity 
and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. The achievement of 
such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but 
that that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked. [My 
emphasis]96  
Mlambo J (in the Labour Appeal Court in Barnard) – who, apparently (and intriguingly), 
could not see how the impact of an affirmative action measure on those excluded from 
its benefits could conceivably have an effect on the legitimacy of the measure97 - 
declared that it is a misconstruction "to render the implementation of restitutionary 
measures subject to the right of an individual's right to equality (sic)". Interestingly, 
in the process (and in the course of a clear application of the van Heerden rationality 
approach), he admits that such restitutionary measures may potentially be unfair.98 
                                        
spokesperson for SAA stated that the Cadet Programme was advertised "as an initiative to bring 
the demographics of SAA's pilots in line with the demographics of South Africa". It explains: "SAA 
has now stated that the final 40 candidates for the 2013 intake fall under the category of previously 
disadvantaged individuals as defined in the Employment Equity Act - and that not a single white 
man has been selected for the cadet programme. The group reportedly consists of 10 black men, 
four black women, nine coloured men, one coloured woman, seven Indian men, two Indian women 
and seven white women. In essence, it would appear that the ban on the employment of white 
male trainee pilots has not been lifted in practice. According to SAA spokesman Tlali Tlali, 'it is 
important to note this in the context of the current reality and measures that need to be taken'. 
Tlali further stated that 'the cadet programme is the airline's effort to transform not only its own 
but also the country's flight deck community, which is nowhere close to reflecting the country's 
demographics'." From a posting for the FW de Klerk Foundation authored by Jacques du Preez (on 
file with the author). 
96  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) para 41. 
97  See SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard 2013 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) (hereinafter Barnard (LAC)) para 20, 
where the learned judge declared: "Although extensive argument was also advanced by the parties 
in relation to affirmative action, the matter has, in my view, little to do with the legitimacy of 
affirmative action, but more with the implementation of such a programme in circumstances where 
persons from non-designated groups are adversely affected thereby." 
98  In Barnard (LAC) para 24 the judge refers to the fact that "our Constitution enshrines the right to 
equitable treatment yet sanctions inequitable conduct" (in the context of affirmative action). 
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On a general note, I think McGregor sums up at least one overarching problem with 
this last judgment well in declaring that "[e]quality did not find its place here; 
representivity was more important".99 Any denial of the fact that even a legitimate 
restitutionary measure can be unfair in its application would be facetious. And surely 
the Constitution calls for us to always ensure a prominent place for fairness in the 
equation when evaluating any potential limitation of rights. After all, Cameron J et al 
in Barnard (CC) tell us that "fairness is a foundational constitutional value".100 In the 
always-eloquent words of Sachs J: 
It would, in my view, do a disservice to section 9(2) to treat it as a fantastical 
constitutional device for leaping over the gritty hurdles of hard social reality and 
escaping from basic equality analysis. It is not a magic analytical slipper which, if no 
toes protrude, converts the wearer into a sovereign princess unrestrained by any 
notions of fairness and beyond the bounds of ordinary constitutional scrutiny.101  
This is really all I am calling for: ordinary constitutional scrutiny of affirmative action 
(as it is applied under the EEA).102 Mlambo J's approach in Barnard (LAC) seems to 
                                        
99  McGregor 2014 SA Merc LJ 88. 
100  Barnard (CC) para 98. 
101  Sachs J, in Van Heerden para 139. 
102  Of course, this would appear to be anathema to the approach proposed by the Constitutional Court 
– compare the unambiguous stance displayed by Mokgoro J in Van Heerden para 87: "Section 9(2) 
is a unique constitutional provision which has been enacted to respond decisively to the particular 
history of inequality and the impact of that history on our society. It makes clear that restitutionary 
measures are part of the scheme for the realisation of substantive equality. A measure which is 
part of the framework for the advancement of equality cannot ever be said to discriminate unfairly. 
That being the case, once a measure can properly be said to satisfy the internal test in section 
9(2) and fall within the ambit of the section, the scrutiny that other measures are subjected to in 
terms of section 9(3) does not apply. Once the state successfully demonstrates that a measure 
falls within section 9(2), that measure is constitutionally compliant without any further justification. 
That being the case, section 9(2) must be used only in appropriate cases and with great 
circumspection. The vision of substantive equality and the need for transformation cannot be 
underestimated. For that reason section 9(2), as an instrument for transformation and the creation 
of a truly equal society, is powerful and unapologetic." Pretorius 2013 SALJ 42, however, provides 
a powerful argument against Mokgoro J's views: "Mokgoro J argued that the main focus in s 9(2) 
of the Constitution is on the group advanced and the mechanism used to advance it ... Therefore, 
measures enacted in terms of s 9(2) ought to be assessed from the perspective of 'the goal 
intended to be advanced'. Fairness review would be out of place, because it would mean that 
undue attention is paid to those disadvantaged by the measure … This reasoning is perfectly 
aligned with a rationality paradigm. As the constitutional theorist Alexy pointed out in his criticism 
of the early equality jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, rationality review 
is not about comparison as such and therefore does not provide a suitable normative yardstick to 
measure the legitimacy of differential treatment (Robert Alexy A Theory of Constitutional Rights 
(trans J Rivers) (2004) 265–6). If the contextual focus of judicial review is limited - as Mokgoro J 
in Van Heerden insists that it should be - to whether a measure is logically related to a given 
remedial goal, its differential impact as such is not addressed ... As argued elsewhere, this 
reduction of equality to rationality restricts the normative reach of the notion of substantive 
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treat potential unfairness as irrelevant, and it is submitted that such an approach is 
simply untenable when dealing with efforts at redress under the Constitution.103 This 
brand of remedial action (or "transformation") is more appropriate – as the saying 
goes - when one is making omelettes, and less so when one is building a nation based 
on the fundamental principles of Ubuntu and non-racialism. In response to this 
approach one must ask whether the equality court's interpretation of the affirmative 
action provision of the Promotion of Equality and Unfair Discrimination Act104 (or 
PEPUDA, the "sister statute" to the EEA, also enacted in terms of the dictate contained 
in section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights) in Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development105 should not be seriously considered here.106 In the course of his 
judgment, Erasmus J referred to section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights and had the following 
to say regarding the constitutional obligation to consider the potential negative impact 
of affirmative action on non-beneficiaries: 
It is relevant to the interpretation of [PEPUDA's affirmative action provision] that 
although affirmative action measures do not necessarily disadvantage any other 
persons, inevitably some measures will have that effect such as when one person is 
preferred over another on the basis of race or gender in the appointment to a position 
for which both had applied. To escape constitutional invalidity such measures must 
come within the protection afforded affirmative action by s 9(2) of the Constitution. 
What is the nature and extent of that protection? If the provisions of ss (2) of s 9 
were to be interpreted as constituting an exception to the unfair discrimination 
proscribed by ss (3), then persons disadvantaged by affirmative action measures 
would have no protection under the equality rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
If the Constitution were an ordinary legislative measure, such a construction of s 9 
would be permissible. But the Constitution is not an ordinary statute. It is the 
supreme law which defines and reveals the ethical principles which underlie all law. 
                                        
equality, since it is effectively deprived of the comparative contextual setting necessary to be able 
to function as an inclusive fairness-based standard for the assessment, evaluation and integration 
of competing equality claims." 
103  Surely this is apparent from the words of Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ, in their concurring 
judgment in Barnard (CC) para 95: "[A]djudicating Ms Barnard's challenge requires us to apply a 
less deferential standard than mere rationality. Her complaint was that she had been unfairly 
discriminated against, in contravention of the Act. In our view, that Act imposes a standard 
different from, and additional to, rationality. The important constitutional values that can be in 
tension when a decision-maker implements remedial measures require a court to examine this 
implementation with a more exacting level of scrutiny." [My emphasis]  
104  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA). S 14(1) of 
the Act provides as follows: ''It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect 
or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the 
members of such groups or categories of persons." 
105  Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 27 ILJ 1811 (SE). 
106  After all, van der Westhuizen J in Barnard (CC) expressly referred to this judgment after declaring 
that "[i]f a measure is used to obliterate a person's chances at progressing in her chosen career, 
it would not pass constitutional muster" - Barnard (CC) para 180 (and fn 197). 
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Those principles are absorbed into and reflected in the values that inform the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. When applying the Bill of Rights, a 
court must promote all those values, and will therefore not readily accept an exclusion 
or diminution of a fundamental right even by another constitutional right, and 
certainly not by any other statute. The Constitution is therefore not subject to the 
canons of construction that govern the interpretation of ordinary statutes. A flexible 
and comprehensive approach is called for, acutely sensitive to all constitutional values 
and objectives. An interpretation of s 9(2) of the Constitution that sees its implicit 
approval of affirmative action measures as excluding or negating the right to equality, 
will therefore offend constitutional principle.107 [My emphasis] 
This approach echoes what the CC advised us in Van Heerden, namely that 
restitutionary measures within the meaning of section 9(2) are not an exception to 
equality. But it also reminds us that non-beneficiaries of affirmative action may also 
lay claim to a right of equality. By implication it also recognises that these same 
beneficiaries may also rightfully claim the constitutional protection of their inherent 
dignity.108 Section 9(1) of the Bill of Rights, of course, also tells us this (as does the 
first sentence of section 9(2)). And, lo and behold, so does Van Heerden.109 Such an 
approach is more balanced than that of Mlambo J, and it does not, inexplicably (and 
as an apparent knee jerk reaction) privilege equality over all other fundamental rights 
and foundational values of the Constitution (in the process, apparently, seeking to 
remove it from the broader scheme of the Bill of Rights – including the provisions of 
the limitations clause). And it does not constitute, as Malan reminds us, such an 
apparently unthinking endorsement of the ideological homogenisation of our society 
under a majoritarian democracy (in a notably obvious blurring of the separation of 
powers). Yes, the court in Van Heerden reminded us that, due to our past, "the 
achievement of equality preoccupies our constitutional thinking".110 And yes, there are 
obvious and understandable tensions here111 when we deal with potential conflict 
between individual rights and interests and constitutionally-mandated measures 
premised on the pursuit of the greater good at the potential expense of individuals. 
In this specific context of the application of affirmative action, "fighting fire with fire 
                                        
107  Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 27 ILJ 1811 (SE) para 18. 
108  See Barnard (CC) para 32. 
109  See, for example, Van Heerden paras 27, 44 of Moseneke J's judgment; also see Barnard (CC) 
para 30 (per Moseneke ACJ); para 101 (per Cameron J et al); paras 143, 146 (per van der 
Westhuizen J). 
110  Van Heerden para 23 (per Moseneke J). 
111  Or "transformative tension", as it was called by Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ in Barnard 
(CC) para 77. 
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gives rise to an inherent tension".112 But this does not mean that the former must 
necessarily, automatically and unquestioningly, bow to the latter. Wiechers, in 
response to Barnard (CC), reminds us that while the pronouncements on upliftment 
and equality in this judgment are laudable, when the rights of the individual are 
sacrificed by such ideals the moral basis of those objectives are fundamentally 
undermined:113 
Upliftment, equality and non-racialism start with the individual, and if the individual's 
entitlements and rights must be sacrificed to serve a claimed greater good of equality, 
we are on the verge of an orchestrated denial of human rights. The old aphorism 
that the individual does not exist for the state, but the state exists for the individual 
and his or her rights and interests, is the central tenet of a free state.114  
This view also resonates in the words of Malan (relying on Dworkin), who points out 
that: 
... the central focus of the judicial function and primary responsibility of courts, unlike 
that of the legislature and the executive, are not these general collective social 
policies and goals, but the protection of individual (constitutional) rights … [Courts] 
must not primarily pursue policies deemed to advance or secure an economic, 
political or social situation for the benefit of all. That is the distinctive terrain of the 
legislature and the executive.115 
The court in Barnard (CC) may very well have misconstrued its role or, at least, to an 
extent defaulted on the constitutional promise of the potential for justice in individual 
cases, which must still apply even to the previously advantaged. After all, to quote 
Sachs J again, "the rich too have rights".116 Taken to its inevitable conclusion, the 
approach of the Labour Appeal Court, by way of Mlambo J, would inevitably deny the 
previously advantaged any such right to constitutional protection and, in effect, 
relegate them to an underclass to the extent that their place in society and in the 
Constitution is denigrated.117 As van der Westhuizen J warned, even the perception of 
such a situation "may threaten the pursuit of our constitutional goal of a society in 
which everyone, regardless of their differences, is equally valued and at home".118 It 
                                        
112  Barnard (CC) para 93. 
113  Wiechers Rapport. 
114  Wiechers Rapport. 
115  Malan 2014 De Jure 134-135. 
116  Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 149. 
117  See Van der Westhuizen J in Barnard (CC) para 180. 
118  Barnard (CC) para 180 (and see the authorities referred to there). 
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would thus, in fact, threaten the pursuit and ultimate achievement of equality, not to 
mention other important constitutional rights and values that will always be in the 
firing line when faced with the insidious ideology of racial representivity pursued as a 
"programme of homogenisation", whereby not only the underclass of minority groups, 
but our very democracy is at threat. 
Such homogenisation programmes that require individuals to change their cultural, 
linguistic and religious characteristics/identities in order to be absorbed into the so-
called national identity constitute an iniuria to those against whom they are directed 
and they are thus an assault against their individual identity. Within a human rights 
paradigm they are an obvious offence against human dignity and freedom of 
expression and the right to freedom of association. If carried out wholesale against 
a whole cultural community, that is subjected to forced assimilation, such 
programmes would constitute attempted cultural genocide. This flies in the face of 
basic minority rights protection, which, apart from prohibiting discrimination against 
minorities, also seeks to guarantee the survival of the distinctive identities of minority 
cultural, religious, linguistic and national communities.119 
I find it increasingly difficult to reconcile the disparate pronouncements of our highest 
court on these (and other) issues. As referred to earlier, we were told in Barnard (CC) 
that "[f]requently the goals of transformation are more important" than the 
impairment of the dignity of those who do not benefit from such measures120 (ie 
especially the white minority). This same court, in Minister of Homes Affairs v 
Fourie,121 however, said as follows: 
Majoritarian opinion can often be harsh to minorities that exist outside the 
mainstream. It is precisely the function of the Constitution and the law to step in and 
counteract rather than reinforce unfair discrimination against a minority. The test, 
whether majoritarian or minoritarian positions are involved, must always be whether 
the measure under scrutiny promotes or retards the achievement of human dignity, 
equality and freedom.122 
Which is it, exactly? Or is it enough simply to sweep the glaring inconsistency in these 
positions under the rug through the rather bald assertion (repeated by Moseneke ACJ 
in Barnard) that affirmative action measures that comply with the almost negligible 
                                        
119  Malan 2010 TSAR 435. 
120  Per Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ in Barnard (CC) para 89, note 93. 
121  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
122  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 94 (as quoted in Malan 2010 TSAR 437-
438). 
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rationality standard set in Van Heerden just cannot be unfair?123 There are other 
examples of this disparity in the views of our Constitutional Court judges, one of which 
is very germane to the issues under discussion here. I have referred to the fact that 
Jafta J, surprisingly and quite disappointingly, appeared to endorse the practice of 
race-based job reservation in his concurring judgment.124 Yet we find Moseneke ACJ 
expressly (in the context of his brief and rather disappointing discussion of the role of 
quotas) stating that "[q]uotas amount to job reservation and are properly prohibited 
by section 15(3) of the [EEA]".125 Frankly, I am sometimes at a loss to explain how 
the judges of this court can agree on anything to the point of writing concurring 
judgments. And the problem is sometimes most starkly illustrated in comparing the 
judgments of the same jurist in different cases.  Startling (for me) here, is the case of 
Justice Moseneke. We have seen that he did not take issue with the hegemony of 
demographics in the application of affirmative action under the Employment Equity 
Act in Barnard (CC). I referred earlier (only in passing) to the potential relevance of 
Ubuntu in this present debate. In Everfresh Market Virginina v Shoprite Checkers126 (a 
contract law case) this same judge declared as follows in the context of the impact of 
                                        
123  Pretorius has highlighted that Van Heerden's rationality test is insufficiently rigorous to provide the 
standard for the testing of affirmative action measures under the equality right: "[R]ationality as 
such is ill-suited to fulfil the basic function of an equality actualising norm, since it lacks the 
normative content to be able to determine whether a differentiating measure actually promotes 
the overall purpose of s 9, which the court in Van Heerden described as the realisation of 'a non-
racial, non-sexist society in which each person will be recognised and treated as a human being 
of equal worth and dignity'. This is so because the rationality inquiry does not interrogate the 
comparative fairness of the impact of differentiating measures on the affected parties. A focus on 
impact has however been singled out by the Court itself as the hallmark of the promotion of 
substantive equality." In doing so, the author observes that other Constitutional Court judgments 
have required more in this context than this same court did in Van Heerden – see Pretorius 2010 
SAJHR 565 (and the cases referred to there). 
124  Barnard (CC) para 227. 
125  Barnard (CC) para 54. And vice versa – the reservation of posts amounts to the application of a 
quota: "Some defenders of strong-preference affirmative action are clearly pursuing only goals 
and not quotas. However, other strong-preference affirmative action policies will most plausibly 
be understood as pursuing quotas rather than mere goals. The claim not to be defending quotas 
is least plausible when it emanates from defenders of set-asides. This is because a set-aside is a 
kind of quota. When one sets aside a specific number of positions or places for 'blacks' then, 
assuming these positions are all filled, one has met a quota. That quota may be only part of a 
broader goal if other forms of affirmative action are also employed. Nevertheless, the places set 
aside are reserved for 'blacks'. When some minimum number of places is reserved one has a 
quota." (Benatar 2008 SALJ 280.) 
126  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC). 
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this foundational value system on the application of the principle of good faith in 
contracts: 
Indeed, it is highly desirable and in fact necessary to infuse the law of contract with 
constitutional values, including values of ubuntu, which inspire much of our 
constitutional compact. On a number of occasions in the past this Court has had 
regard to the meaning and content of the concept of ubuntu. It emphasises the 
communal nature of society and carries in it the ideas of humaneness, social justice 
and fairness, and envelopes the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, 
human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity.127 
Yet, this same judge does not see that the EEA's numbers game may very well be the 
antithesis of Ubuntu in the context of affirmative action. Where is the fairness, group 
solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and 
collective unity in this form of cold and insensitive numerical target-chasing? Unless, 
of course, "group solidarity" envisages only the interests of one predominant group. 
The ideology of demographic representivity, with its fundamental racial focus, 
privileges the most numerous racial group as constituting the norm, and group 
solidarity equates to conformity to this basic norm to the exclusion of other groups. 
This, I would suggest, runs counter to the principles of Ubuntu, unless Ubuntu is 
reduced to an "Afro-centric country club" ideal which would rubbish the underlying 
ethos of our democratic (and human rights-based) Constitution.  
The judiciary, more generally (and including the Constitutional Court), if it aims to 
endorse the numbers-driven species of affirmative action promoted by the 
Employment Equity Act, should have the courage of its convictions while being honest 
with us all. It should then rather tell us that (in practice if not in the often elaborate 
rhetoric of Constitutional Court judges) the form of affirmative action as 
conceived and applied under the EEA actually is an exception to the equality 
guarantee. At least then such measures may eventually be realised as having a 
limited life-cycle.128 As things currently stand, seeing that the equality right is a central 
                                        
127  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) paras 73-74. 
128  Some believe that the EEA's affirmative action provisions have this characteristic: "[C]aution should 
be taken against perceiving affirmative action as an inseverable aspect of equality. Affirmative 
action is a temporary measure that will outlive its purpose whereas equality is a value without a 
shelf-life. Affirmative action is a measure that will be cast from our jurisprudence upon the 
'normalisation of our society' or when 'a state of generalised equality' is achieved." (Partington and 
Van der Walt 2005 Obiter 596.) 
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and hopefully permanent feature of our Bill of Rights, there simply can and never will 
be an end to affirmative action.129 As respected Stanford economist Thomas Sowell, a 
staunch opponent of the idea that demographic representivity can ever be achieved 
(except by the means of highly artificial quotas), put it: 
In short, the even representation of groups as a norm is difficult or impossible to find 
anywhere, while the uneven representation that is regarded as a special deviation to 
be corrected is pervasive across the most disparate societies. People differ – and 
have for centuries. It is hard to imagine how they could not differ, given the enormous 
range of differing historical, cultural, geographic, demographic, and other factors 
shaping the particular skills, habits and attitudes of different groups. Any "temporary" 
policy whose duration is defined by the goal of achieving something that has never 
been achieved before, anywhere in the world, could more fittingly be characterised 
as eternal.130  
If we remove the application of (and disputes about) "affirmative action" under the 
Employment Equity Act from the paradigm of equality, at least then these provisions 
could be challenged on the basis of the constitutionally illegitimate representivity 
objective that they are designed to pursue (and their authors or defenders will not be 
able to hide behind the equality clause, as they invariably do).131 In fact, if we think 
back we'll recall that the Employment Equity Act is actually quite honest about this in 
so brazenly declaring its purpose (in section 2) explicitly to be the pursuit of 
                                        
129  Especially not in the light of the use of demographic representivity in this context. McGregor, 
writing on the question of when affirmative action will end, reminds us that "national demographics 
are not consistent and therefore targets may vary with time. It is submitted that it is not realistic 
to expect an end to affirmative action on this basis" - McGregor 2014 SA Merc LJ 75. 
130  Sowell Thomas Sowell Reader 292. 
131  I believe that, unfortunately, there is some truth in David Benatar's following observation regarding 
the apparent lack of a need for a rigorous defence of affirmative action (which is surely the case 
under Van Heerden's rationality test): "In the legal sphere, for example, affirmative action has 
been protected from questioning by a constitutional provision in the equality section of the Bill of 
Rights, which explicitly permits 'legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination'. Instead of allowing the 
courts to determine whether affirmative action laws and policies are compatible in principle with 
the right to equality, any judicial questioning of the matter is forestalled." (Benatar 2008 SALJ 
275.) Pretorius et al also observe the following: "[The authorisation in section 9(2) of the equality 
right in the Bill of Rights] of the use of affirmative action for the purpose of protection and 
advancement of those disadvantaged by unfair discrimination does not preclude the possibility that 
affirmative action may be taken for other purposes. Should, however, affirmative action be taken 
for objectives other than that specified by section 9(2), such measures will be judged according to 
a stricter standard of review than are remedial measures. The onus will be on an employer to 
establish that a particular non-remedial objective is a compelling enough operational or institutional 
objective to justify preferential treatment." Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law 
9-25. In a footnote to this section, the authors explain how "racial or gender balancing" (the 
objective of achieving representivity for its own sake) has consistently been rejected in the United 
States of America as a legitimate affirmative action goal. 
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representivity.132 So all we really need is for those defenders of measures pursued in 
terms of this policy, and our judges, it seems, to be more honest and to drop the 
pretence of the purported pursuit of substantive equality when it comes to defending 
this odious exercise of counting heads.133 
Let me be controversial: The Employment Equity Act – or, at least, its provisions 
dealing with affirmative action - is little more than a mangy wolf in sheep's clothing.134 
The Act is a plebeian placebo enacted by an all-powerful majority party whose support 
base is overwhelmingly aligned along racial lines, largely for the benefit of the 
supporters of that party at the expense of just about all others (irrespective of their 
political affiliation, or any other attributes except race and sex, and to a lesser extent, 
disability). It is a shining example of the legislative advancement of majoritarian 
democracy,135 and it makes perfect sense in the context of any democracy, as 
                                        
132  Maybe we should also stop talking about "affirmative action" under the Act (even though the Act, 
of course, uses this terminology) in the light of the fact that this term is traditionally used within 
the equality paradigm. I would suggest that the term "positive action policy" might be an 
alternative (even though this should not be read to imply the "positivity" of the potential outcomes 
of such policies aimed at pursuing demographic representivity). Nolan uses this term in the context 
of gender equality (and, interestingly, includes the use of quotas in this concept with no apparent 
qualms about their constitutionality) – see Nolan 2004 SAPL 382. 
133  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 36, observes (in his discussion of the proper standard for the constitutional 
review of affirmative action measures) that the Labour Court judgment in Barnard only referred to 
Van Heerden in passing, in two footnotes. He finds this surprising and inconsistent with the 
importance of the constitutional equality jurisprudence for cases under the EEA: "Van Heerden is 
cited as authority for the proposition that 'the need for representivity must be weighed up against 
the affected individual's rights to equality and a fair decision made' …This citation sits 
uncomfortably with the whole tenor of the Constitutional Court's … reasoning regarding the 
standard of review." I would suggest that, in the light of the glaring inconsistency between the 
EEA and the equality right in the Bill of Rights, courts adjudicating future affirmative action cases 
under the Act should pay even less attention to Van Heerden (and now, Barnard (CC), and other 
equality cases). 
134  The following words, used to describe the relevant employment equity plan at issue in the case of 
Naidoo, do well to also describe the EEA (as the legislature's chosen instrument to promote the 
equality right in our workplaces) and the ways in which its provisions have been implemented, 
especially in public sector employment: "While posing as a measure that is constitutionally 
compliant, it in fact discriminates unfairly and unlawfully. It may not have been the intended result 
to create barriers and patterns of disadvantage, but it does in practice have such effect. These 
effects undermine equal opportunity and the pursuit of substantive equality. They undermine too 
the constitutional objective of creating a non-racial and non-sexist egalitarian society." Naidoo 
paras 189-190. 
135  Which Malan 2010 TSAR 436 describes as follows: "Majoritarian democracy gives full sway to the 
will and preferences of the majority, regardless of the impact that these might have on minorities. 
Seeing the views of the majority and those of the whole of the national population as one and the 
same thing, majoritarian democracy translates the will of the majority into official state policy, 
regardless of its harmful consequences for the minorities. Majoritarian democracy is premised on 
the crude utilitarian principle that state policy should be based on what behoves the strongest – 
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(presumably) reflecting an expression of the will of the majority, a fact which makes 
it especially unlikely to be repealed.136 Apart from its provenance under a liberation 
government with such a large, racially-aligned support base, the form and nature of 
this legislation, and the fact that it is still with us even after a decade of torrid, race-
based social engineering of our workplaces, makes even more sense when one 
considers its innocuous reception on the world stage. This, of course, is only truly 
understandable if that stage is lit from the perspective of Apartheid as a crime against 
humanity (and if one also understands the psychology behind the resultant hero's 
welcome to be expected for any 'restorative' policy authored by a populist liberation 
movement which has always billed itself as the saviour of millions by ridding the world 
of such a crime against humanity). But what shady villain waits in the wings?: 
                                        
on what pleases the majority – irrespective of how this might impact on the minority, who might 
suffer pain from that what pleases the majority, even though it does not concern any specific 
interest of the majority. Utilitarian democracy allows for the free reign of the strongest – the 
majority – in favour of whom all political power is monopolised. Conversely, it leaves the minority 
– delivered to the will of the majority – with no power at all, even in relation to questions that are 
of core interest to the minorities and of no interest to the majority. The majority is therefore the 
only sector of the demos with meaningful political and governing power – kratos. Majoritarian 
democracy premised on the utilitarian principle is at best democratic only in part, namely to the 
extent that the majority can govern their own interest, but it is glaringly undemocratic in that it 
leaves the minorities devoid of any kratos, and thus vulnerable to domination by the majority." 
136  As Martin Brassey observed in his critical piece on the Act (which was, at the time, not yet in 
force): "A political challenge to the proposed Employment Equity Act seems doomed to fail. It 
provides a benefit for the majority at the expense of a minority and such initiatives always make 
good politics. Whatever hope exists of defeating the Act, therefore, lies in a challenge under the 
Constitution." (Brassey 1998 ILJ 1361.) Farrell, in his brief analysis of the legitimacy of the EEA in 
the light of South Africa's international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) (or ICCPR) views the role of black political dominance in South Africa as 
"problematic": "The ICCPR is a document intended to protect individual rights from abuse by one's 
own government. Any attempt by a state to favour the majority of the population when that 
majority is politically dominant might be viewed as contrary to the Covenant. The potential for 
discrimination against the white minority by the [South African] government strengthens this 
argument. One of the recognised limitations on affirmative action is that it may not lead to 
discrimination. A government that enacts affirmative action legislation that is detrimental to a non-
dominant minority is clearly suspect, and such an action could certainly be viewed as actually or 
potentially discriminatory. This concern is heightened by an attitude that whites simply cannot be 
the subjects of discrimination. This is evidenced by the [White Paper on Transformation of the 
Public Service, 1998's] definition of 'unfair discrimination' as 'measures, attitudes and behaviours 
that obstruct the enjoyment of equal rights and opportunities in employment for black people, 
women and people with disabilities'." The author answers his own concerns by pointing out that 
the EEA is all about economic as opposed to political inequality, and that the use of preferential 
measures to advance, economically, members of a politically dominant group are justified. While 
he finds that "limited preferential treatment" through the means of the EEA probably does not 
violate the provisions of the ICCPR, he does, however, conclude that "[o]f course, it is imperative, 
particularly in this situation, that preferential treatment be used temporarily and that great care is 
taken to avoid impermissible discrimination against South Africa's white minority". (Farrell 2002 
TCLR 221-223.) 
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"Racism" is commonly understood as the doctrine of racial superiority of one race 
over the other. However … some of the Nazi's most effective propaganda against the 
Jews appealed to the principle of "racial equality". (Equally, much anti-Semitic 
legislation adopted by European states in the 1930s and early 1940s was directed 
towards enforcing an "equality of outcomes" in the professions, economy, press and 
cultural life of their countries.) This helped open the door to widespread, and 
ultimately open-ended, societal acceptance of severe and escalating discrimination 
against individuals of Jewish descent. For, if society (or world opinion) accepts the 
principle, upfront, that 6 out of 7 individuals should be ejected from their occupation, 
in pursuit of the goal of racial proportionality, it is difficult to see at what point it will 
recover its sense of right and wrong. By the time the 5th or 6th individual is pushed 
aside society will be so compromised by what it has already acceded to, and so 
habituated to injustice, that it is hardly likely to lift a finger in protest when, as 
invariably happens, the 7th gets thrown out as well, and so on and on. The question 
is why this wind [of "demographic representivity"], which has brought with it to so 
much destruction and misery across Europe and Africa, is still not recognised by so 
much intellectual opinion as smelling deeply rotten?137 
 The bitter irony, of course, is that the Employment Equity Act – this purported saviour 
of the broken - offends some of the most fundamental underlying values and founding 
principles of our Constitution, not least non-racialism, non-sexism, the promotion of 
human dignity and freedom, and the rule of law. I am not stating this with the intention 
of arguing that affirmative action (generally) is anything approaching "reverse 
discrimination" or the like; I know that it is not. But the way that this Act designs and 
delineates the framework for affirmative action programmes is unconstitutional, and 
thus does not qualify for the benefits of a presumption of fairness under section 9(2) 
of the Bill of Rights (or section 6(2)(a) of the Act itself). And it is the EEA's particular 
sphere of application of the ANC government's demographic representivity ideology 
(which is, arguably, acceptable to some limited extent and in much more watered-
down form in the public administration)138 to the private sector and to private 
                                        
137  Myburgh 2014 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/race-quotas-the-terrible-power-
of-demographic-repr. 
138  Malan explains how (demographic) representivity may have a legitimate role in this context. He 
believes that this is the case where the state deals with certain interests that might be regarded 
as equal stake common interests of the entire national population, which interests "are not peculiar 
to a particular community (culturally, linguistically, religiously etc), in contradistinction with the 
rest, which have a discernibly higher stake than any other community". He explains: "[T]he 
application of the representivity principle in the case of equal stake common interests also reflects 
a communitarian perspective of society. This is so because it recognises communities (by requiring 
representation for them) not only in the case where specific community interests are being dealt 
with, but also in cases where interests are the same and do not run along community lines. From 
a communitarian point of view the principle of representivity can therefore be regarded as 
commendable when it is applied to equal stake common interests." (Malan 2010 TSAR 438-439). 
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individuals, that is mostly attributable to the problems experienced in practice in 
application of the Act. The perpetuation of this notion of demographic representivity 
would lead to the "re-racialisation of the economy and of our society, down to the 
second decimal place. It would disempower minorities by confining them to shrinking 
demographic pens in virtually every facet of their lives".139 
The Employment Equity Act should be viewed as a significant blight on our progressive 
constitutional democracy, although it constitutes the manifestation (in the 
employment sphere) of a fundamental doctrinal pillar of our governing party's central 
ideology of transformation and its dearest held policies, and as such will remain largely 
sacrosanct unless a higher power (the judiciary, one would hope) intervenes. The Act's 
apparent immunity in academic and other circles results largely from a misplaced 
sense of political correctness, and from the fear that it invariably awakes in its 
opponents (of being labelled a racist, a colonialist, a "counter-revolutionary", or a 
"bloody agent" - or all of the above …). Twenty years into our democracy we must be 
able to air such views as these, free from fear of persecution. We should also be 
allowed the space to attempt to convince those with different views that action needs 
to be taken. Yes, opposing this Act may be unpopular, but since when has popularity 
ever been a guarantee of good sense? Both my young nieces just love the music of 
that Bieber kid. 
Our liberal-egalitarian constitutional project – and its avowed emphasis on 
accountability and on speaking truth to power - requires more than just kow-towing 
to the majority view. The rule of law is so much more than "this is the rule, and 
therefore it is law" (Just ask anyone who experienced the ludicrous but obscene 
practices of the erstwhile dispensation in this country about the trials and tribulations 
of the "dompas"). As has been observed (echoing Mureinik's views on our 
Constitution's insistence on a culture of justification rather than a culture of 
authority):140 
                                        
139  Steward 2012 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-arithmetic-of-racial-domination. 
140  The author explained notion of a culture of justification as follows: "[A] culture in which every 
exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests 
on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force 
of its command. The new order must be a community built on persuasion, not coercion." (Mureinik 
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Constitutional legitimacy does not rest solely on equal voting rights. The idea of 
Socratic contestation underlying proportionality-based judicial review 'expresses the 
commitment that legitimate authority over any individual is limited by what can be 
demonstrably justified to the person burdened in terms of public reason. If a 
legislative act burdens an individual in a way that is not susceptible to a justification 
he might reasonably accept, then it does not deserve to be enforced as law.141  
'I am male, I am white, and I am physically able.' 
If this last sounds like some Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous confession, it is apt - 
I do have a problem, and a rather serious one at that: Yes, I will freely admit to being 
someone who was "previously advantaged". But for all that, I may very well currently 
be, for all intents and purposes, a second-class citizen in the country of my birth, 
which country, ironically, boasts a Constitution frequently hailed by the outside word 
as one of the most progressive in existence.142 The Constitutional Court's judgment in 
Barnard has further paved the way for this, not because it was clearly or even 
inherently wrong (although it may very well be unjust), but because it was so tentative 
in its apparent unwillingness to deal with matters that affect thousands of South 
Africans on a daily basis. Following reports in the wake of the judgment it was 
interesting to consider the degree of unhappiness felt in certain quarters, and how 
this was expressed with a proverbial sigh of despair with reference to the fact that the 
claimant in this case had now exhausted all domestic legal remedies in South Africa 
(her legal team were, at the time, threatening an approach to the United Nations in 
                                        
1994 SAJHR 32.) Also see Pieterse 2005 SAPL 161: "[One should not] deny the potentially 
destructive impact of public power on the achievement of substantive equality, social justice or 
private law justice, nor to say that societal transformation is possible without rethinking the manner 
in which public power is kept in check. Given the virtually untested (and uncontested) manner in 
which the organs of the apartheid state could encroach upon even the most basic freedoms of the 
majority of the population, it is necessary to ensure that every exercise of public power may 
properly be scrutinised for compliance with human rights standards." 
141  Pretorius 2013 SALJ 40 (with reference to Kumm 2010 Law and Ethics of Human Rights 171). 
142  One should at least question whether the new, democratic South Africa's treatment of minorities 
through "recognition without empowerment" might be in a process of flux (partly through the 
application of the ideology of demographic representivity) towards the disempowerment of the 
white minority and minority "designated" groups, and whether the following observations of 
Murray and Simeon, expressed as recently as 2007, are still or will remain accurate for long if such 
processes remain untested by our judiciary (and specifically by the Constitutional Court): "There 
is no suggestion that the African majority is riven by internal linguistic and ethnic differences. 
There is no suggestion of systematic exclusion or repression of minorities by the majority. The 
debates we have noted are no greater than one might expect in any other society as diverse as 
South Africa. Thus, the predictions … that, once apartheid rule was ended, new ethnic conflicts 
would polarize the country have proven unfounded." (Murray and Simeon 2007 ICON 726.) 
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order to assess whether South African law complies with international best practice 
regarding the prohibition of all forms of racism). I was reminded of the words of 
Nicholson JA (as he then was in the Labour Appeal Court), as expressed in an unfair 
dismissal case (and in respect of the review of administrative action, rather than that 
of judicial decisions): 
In a perfect society with unlimited resources full rights of appeal should be allowed 
from every administrative decision. Society has an inbred distaste for the spectre of 
a remediless recipient of administrative injustice.143 
Is Ms Barnard the now remediless recipient of judicial injustice? Even though Mokgoro 
J in Van Heerden declared that section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights "as an instrument for 
transformation and the creation of a truly equal society, is powerful and 
unapologetic",144 does someone (apart, maybe, from her legal team) owe Ms Barnard 
an apology? As already said, I am not convinced that the judges of the CC were (all) 
clearly wrong, just that they (for the most part) were inappropriately tentative in their 
approach to a case that – by their own admission145 - carried much broader societal 
implications beyond what had happened to the claimant and what had been decided 
by the National Commissioner of Police in respect of the filling of a specific vacant 
post. Their oath of office requires the judges of this court to do more. Wiechers 
observes that the CC in Barnard (and other recent judgments) appears to have shifted 
from its bold and no nonsense approach in those earlier ground-breaking cases that 
law students still study today, which dealt with the certification of the Constitution, 
which abolished the death penalty, which ordered the provision of antiretrovirals to 
those in need, and which changed the law's treatment of gay relationships (amongst 
other things). He feels that the CC has increasingly come to function like a highest 
court of appeal, taking minor procedural points and raising technicalities in order to 
wash its hands of weighty matters that come before it. As Wiechers points out, while 
                                        
143  Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe 2000 3 BLLR 243 (LAC) para 35. 
144  Van Heerden para 87. 
145  See, for example, Moseneke ACJ in Barnard (CC) para 4: "We are seized with a dispute over 
pressing constitutional concerns of equality and non-discrimination – matters of considerable 
personal and public importance. Moreover, the divergent reasoning and outcomes of the two 
appellate courts impel us to resolve the dispute." Also see Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ 
in para 75: "This is the first case before this Court that deals with the standard to be applied in 
assessing the lawfulness of the individual implementation of constitutionally compliant 
restitutionary measures. It is important to give guidance on this difficult issue." 
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the CC is not merely an ordinary court of appeal with the power to review judgments 
of lower courts, the majority of the judges in Barnard were of the opinion that the 
claimant should rather have attacked the decision of the Commissioner of Police rather 
than the promotions policy of the employer. Should a court charged with protecting 
our Constitution and giving deeper meaning to its provisions not have done more? I 
would say yes, not necessarily in order to assist an ill-advised claimant, but in order 
to provide the rest of us with guidance as to what the Constitution actually requires.146 
In the light of the still quite pristine reputation of our Constitution, what may 
sometimes be forgotten is that, even so, it is still and should always remain a work in 
progress. If this Constitution is not a living document it will lose most if not all of both 
its continued relevance and its legitimacy. Does Barnard (CC) reflect this? Does this 
judgment highlight a shameful failure by these judges to recognise their pivotal role 
as "constitution-makers"?147 Or does it reflect little more than a court showing an 
abundance of caution and a fear of rocking the boat in respect of a fundamentally 
important issue that came before it only for the second time in two decades of 
democracy? In respect of the court's failure to deal, in a real and convincing manner, 
with the role of representivity in this debate, is this just nothing less than one should 
expect from an institution that has itself been so aggressively targeted to reflect 
representivity?148 I have been controversial enough already, so I may as well really 
step out on a limb and wonder aloud whether the discrepancies in the Constitutional 
Court judgments regarding such fundamental aspects of our Constitution and its 
transformational agenda (and between such judgments and the lived reality of the 
ideology of demographic representivity in action in current-day South Africa) may be 
due to something that should leave all in the legal fraternity (and beyond it) cold. 
                                        
146  Wiechers Rapport. 
147  See Davis 2010 SAJHR. 
148  Malan 2010 TSAR 432 points to this issue, as highlighted by an esteemed former South African 
jurist: "On 18 August 2009 [in a public lecture at the University of the Witwatersrand] a former 
justice of the constitutional court, [Johann] Kriegler, noted that representivity has become the 
overriding principle applied in the selection of judges by the Judicial Service Commission, in spite 
of the fact that it flies in the face of the constitution. Kriegler observed: 'But, from where I look at 
the judiciary today, and the way I have been watching the Judicial Service Commission, this 
ethnic/gender balance in section 174 of the Constitution has become the be-all and the end-all 
when the JSC makes its selections. And if it is not the be-all and end-all, at the very least it has 
been elevated to the overriding fundamental requirement.'" 
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Malan quotes the then Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
who told Parliament in a 2003 speech on transformation of the judiciary that this 
concept comprises two elements: 
[F]irst, the realisation of the objective equitable representation of blacks and women, 
described as "diversity, personnel or symbolism transformation"; and, second, 
transformation relating to the intellectual or ideological approach adopted by judges 
and magistrates, which he referred to as "intellectual content or substantive 
transformation". [My emphasis]149 
Wessels150 refers to a 2000 report by the Public Service Commission which explained 
the "action dimension" of transformation of the service as comprising the following 
two elements; namely to: 
(a) create a genuinely representative public service which reflects the major 
characteristics of South African demography, without eroding efficiency and 
competence'; and '(b) facilitate the transformation of the attitudes and behaviour of 
public servants towards a democratic ethos underlined by the overriding importance 
of human rights …151  
The author observes that "[t]he reshaping of the public service accordingly seems to 
comprise two elements, namely the reshaping of the characteristic of the public service 
in terms of its representativeness, and the reshaping of its orientations or attitudes in 
terms of its democratic ethos".152 Would that democratic ethos be a majoritarian one, 
hell-bent on transforming our society in the image of one (majority racial) group, never 
mind what the Constitution might have to say about this? Is the ideology of 
demographic representivity (in the transformation of the public service) ultimately 
aimed at changing the thinking of those in official positions?153 If so, has our judiciary 
                                        
149  Malan explains: "Speaking in the national assembly [Minister] De Lange explained that 
transformation of the judiciary comprised two elements: first, the realisation of the objective 
equitable representation of blacks and women, described as 'diversity, personnel or symbolism 
transformation'; and, second, transformation relating to the intellectual or ideological approach 
adopted by judges and magistrates, which he referred to as 'intellectual content or substantive 
transformation'. Transformation therefore requires that the profile of the national population be 
reflected in the composition of the judiciary and, on the other hand, that judges must have 
particular convictions, namely to think in a particular way." (Malan 2010 TSAR 432.) 
150  Wessels 2008 Politeia. 
151  Wessels 2008 Politeia 23. 
152  Wessels 2008 Politeia 23. 
153  Which, of course, would not necessarily be a bad thing: "[I]n South Africa's current dispensation, 
there is a need for judicial transformation to embrace changes in judicial attitudes. Judges must 
embrace and enforce the principles of a fundamentally new legal order. Furthermore, the 
transformative nature of South Africa's Constitution means that judges can no longer cast 
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started to show signs of this? Or is the air just too rare on Constitution Hill? All of this 
might indicate that someone has misread the text of the Constitution and has opted 
to treat the judiciary as just another part of the public service which, according to 
section 197, "must loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day".154 
Leaving aside the implications of that word "lawful" in our current context, this would, 
of course, be completely anathema to the separation of powers and the independence 
of the judiciary from the executive and legislative arms of the state. (As section 165 
tells us, the "courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.")155 It would 
also, of course, be morally bankrupt. This being said, however, at least one 
commentator would appear to endorse something a little different from our courts 
when it comes to fulfilling their part in the process of transformative constitutionalism 
– and this appears to endorse the furtherance of the political goals of the day in the 
decisions of our judges: 
[I]t has been pointed out time and time again that both constitutionalism and 
adjudication are distinctly political – "the issue is not whether, but what type of, 
political values should enter into adjudication". The South African Constitution, as is 
common for constitutions in transitional societies, unashamedly dictates the political 
vision required from its interpretative community by articulating unequivocally the 
political goals to which those tasked with its interpretation and concrete application 
must aspire. It enjoins them to "uphold and advance its transformative design" and 
hence to participate actively in the political project of transformation. This means 
firstly that South African judges must aim in their judgments to further (or at least 
not to hinder) the achievement of substantive equality and social justice. This would 
often require that judges (in interpreting rights in the Bill of Rights, measuring state 
compliance with the duties these impose and remedying non-compliance with such 
duties) transcend traditional conceptions of their role under a liberal model of 
separation of powers – a transition for which the provisions of the Constitution 
discussed above well equip them.156 
                                        
themselves as defenders of the status quo. The judiciary must instead facilitate the creation of the 
new society that the Constitution envisages." (Wesson and Du Plessis 2008 SAJHR.) Of course, 
much of the legitimacy of this view depends on the meaning placed on "transformation" under our 
Constitution, and the hegemony of the governmental agenda of the pursuit of demographic 
representation, it is submitted, might cast such transformative ambitions in respect of what is 
expected in terms of judicial attitudes in a different (and less flattering) light. 
154  S 197(1) of the Constitution. 
155  S 165(2) of the Constitution. 
156  Pieterse 2005 SAPL 166. 
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While some might read this as apparent constitutional licence for Van Heerden's 
rationality test (especially, in the context of its application to such a manifestation of 
the governmental representivity ideology as presented in Barnard), they should 
reconsider. This same author continues: 
[J]udges must demand, in every constitutional matter, that the other branches of 
government present adequate justification for all their actions that impact on the 
constitutional rights of the citizenry. Where justifications advanced do not reverberate 
with the tenets of constitutional transformation, they should not pass constitutional 
muster. Insisting consistently on justification which reverberates with the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Constitution requires not only that these are expressly 
articulated in judgments but also that the judiciary abandons the remnants of a 
culture of extreme deference to the executive which it has cultivated over years of 
adjudicating the actions of the sovereign apartheid state.157 
Whatever the reason(s) for the apparent lack of commitment in our highest court to 
facing up to what I view to be such a blatant and abhorrent distortion of the underlying 
values and, indeed, the provenance, of our Bill of Rights, one can only hope that 
someone else will be willing to rock the boat, and soon. Give it a vigorous shaking, 
please. We all need to be shot of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment 
Equity Act and of the nonsensical, grossly irrational and what I would suggest to be a 
criminally unfair ideology of demographic representivity (as a rather poxy proxy for 
equality). If I may be crude for a moment: having spent some time in Durban in recent 
years I am proud to say that I have some delightful Indian friends. If any of them 
were to seek my advice about the future prospects for their children to find 
employment in democratic South Africa, should I advise them to stop using birth 
control (and to spread the word amongst their (Indian) friends)?158 When one 
considers the "immutability" of some of those arbitrary, listed grounds of unfair 
discrimination in section 9(3) of our Bill of Rights - and the fact that the nonsensical 
pursuit of demographic representivity in all our workplaces is just as arbitrary, if not 
more so – this really is the only way that I can see to ensure that those of us who are 
"numerically challenged" in the new South Africa will ever get a fair shake. 
                                        
157  Pieterse 2005 SAPL 166. 
158  Although doing something along these lines may justifiably be viewed as promoting "perverse race 
rivalry", and "inter-group contestation, conflict and protests amongst the designated groups" – see 
Shaik AJ in Naidoo paras 177, 188. 
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If anyone will ever end up reading this piece, I fully expect some vociferous criticism. 
Some of it, no doubt, will come from those very learned and respected intellectuals 
who have written, exhaustively, on equality and redress under our Constitution (they 
know who they are, and I have immense respect for their contributions to the 
constitutional debate). But we need to scale things down quite a bit, not least because 
we must find a way to explain these complicated principles to many ordinary South 
Africans who are faced on a daily basis with the pernicious effects of the 
implementation of policies (and ideology) that affect them very directly, and which 
they simply cannot grasp with reference only to impressive intellectual arguments. 
Who can blame them? I am convinced that (sadly) very few South African living rooms 
contain the collected works of Immanuel Kant,159 Michele Foucalt and Jean Francois 
Lyotard,160 John Stuart Mill161 or Amartya Sen.162 Very few ordinary South Africans 
apply for jobs or for promotion, or ply their trade, in those lofty but often obscure and 
other-worldly, ivory towers. As an academic who has discussed these burning issues 
that are festering in our society in classes and seminars with both undergraduate and 
postgraduate students (note: an environment made up mostly of the privileged), I am 
convinced that the informed (not rhetoric-loaded and invective-filled) debate must be 
broadened beyond our classrooms and law journals. If the subject matter of this piece 
is characterised by any one thing it is that the efforts to pursue true equality in our 
country currently is not a process that takes place on the pages of law books and 
statutes; it takes place in our workplaces and amongst ordinary people. 
We need to find some common sense, and we must find it fast.163 The clock is ticking. 
Let's hope we are not yet at five minutes to midnight in respect of the future of what 
is, if we are perfectly honest, our still quite fragile constitutional project. It deserves 
so much better than this. As do we all, including - let me just grab my calculator - at 
                                        
159  See Barnard (CC) para 172 (per van der Westhuizen J). 
160  See De Vos 2012 SALJ. 
161  See Benatar 2008 SALJ. 
162  See Dupper 2008 SAJHR. 
163  At the time of writing, there are some encouraging signs in this regard. Acting chair of the Public 
Service Commission, Richard Sizani, in addressing a Developmental State Conference in Pretoria, 
on 11 November 2014, suggested that the time has come for government to reconsider the 
application of affirmative action (and cadre deployment) in the public service – see Mbanjwa 2014 
http://www.citypress.co.za/news/isnt-time-rethink-sas-transformation-policies/. 
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least 100% of the beneficiaries of "affirmative action" under the Employment 
(In)Equity Act. 
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